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With much effort being placed on the physical, procedural, and technological solutions for
Information Systems (IS) cybersecurity, research studies tend to focus their efforts on large
organizations while overlooking very smaller organizations (below 50 employees). This
study addressed the failure to prevent data breaches in Very Small Enterprises (VSEs).
VSEs contribute significantly to the economy, however, are more prone to cyber-attacks
due to the limited risk mitigations on their systems and low cybersecurity skills of their
employees. VSEs utilize Point-of-Sale (POS) systems that are exposed to cyberspace,
however, they are often not equipped to prevent complex cybersecurity issues that can
result in them being at risk to a data breach. In addition, the absence of federal laws that
force VSEs to adhere to standards such as the Payment Card Industry Data Security
Standard (PCI-DSS) leaves it up to the discretion of the VSEs to invest in cybersecurity
countermeasures aimed at preventing a data breach. Therefore, this study investigated the
role that cybersecurity social responsibility plays in motivating the owners of these
companies to engage in cybersecurity measures geared at preventing data breaches.
This study developed and validated using Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) a cybersecurity
risk-responsibility taxonomy using the constructs of VSEs’ owners’ perceived
cybersecurity social responsibility (CySR) and risk of data breach (RDB) in order to better
understand their level of exposure to a data breach. Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA)
using Principal Component Analysis (PCA) was conducted to extract the significant factors
for CySR and RDB. The study also addressed whether there were significant differences
in VSEs owners’ perceived RDB and perceived CySR based on three demographics: (1)
type of industry, (2) implementation of chip technology, (3) compliance with PCI-DSS.
This study was conducted in three phases. Phase 1 utilized a panel of 13 information
security SMEs and used the Delphi technique to review characteristics for RDB and CySR
that were derived from literature. The results of the expert review were subjected to further
validation by means of a pilot study using a small sample of the study population (Phase
2). The pilot study population included 20 organizations with number of employees ranging
from less than five to 50 total employees across seven different industries.
Phase 3 of the study included the main data collection using the modified survey instrument
from the pilot study. 105 VSEs anonymously participated in the main data collection phase
of the study. The collected data was subjected data EFA which identified three factors
comprised of 15 items for RDB and two factors comprised of 13 items for CySR. In
addition, descriptive statistics was obtained and evaluated to determine if significant

differences exist in VSEs owners’ perceived RDB based on type of industry,
implementation of Europay, Mastercard and Visa (EMV) chip technology and, compliance
with PCI-DSS. One-way Analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used to evaluate whether
significant differences existed based on the VSEs demographics.
The results of the study indicated that there was a statistically significant difference in both
RDB and CySR for industry, use of EMV Chip and, PCI-DSS compliance. This study
demonstrates that there is a relationship between CySR and cybersecurity and that the
CySR instrument could be used to assess cybersecurity practices in small businesses. In
addition, this study may assist organizations in understanding and mitigating cybersecurity
data breaches.
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Chapter 1
Introduction

Background
Organizations are benefitting greatly from the advancement of Information
Systems (IS) (Earl & Feeney, 2012). However, this also increases their exposure to data
breaches (Gordon et al., 2014; Jang-Jaccard & Nepal, 2014; Shim, 2011).
A data breach is a compromise of the security, confidentiality, or integrity of, or
the loss of, computerized data that results in, or there is a reasonable basis to
conclude has resulted in the unauthorized acquisition (via the Internet) of
sensitive personally identifiable information; or access to sensitive personally
identifiable information that is for an unauthorized purpose, or in excess of
authorization (Whitehouse.gov, 2015, p. 1).
According to Shim (2011), there has been an explosion of malicious activities that
endanger the soundness of organizations’ information system (IS) security. The Joint
Task Force (JTF) on Cybersecurity Education (2017), defined cybersecurity as “A
computing-based discipline involving technology, people, information, and processes to
enable assured operations in the context of adversaries. It involves the creation,
operation, analysis, and testing of secure computer systems” (p. 16). The need for IS
security and in particular, cybersecurity, is becoming far more widespread and of
tremendous importance as data breaches become more prevalent (Van Niekerk & Von
Solms, 2010; Von Solms & Van Niekerk, 2013). Reports from the Ponemon Institute
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showed that over the past 3 years there has been an increase in cyber-attacks on small
businesses (Ponemon Institute, 2016, 2017, 2018).
Very Small Enterprises (VSEs) are particularly at risk of data breaches due to the
simplicity of their security measures (Berry & Berry, 2018; Harris & Patten, 2014).
Straub and Welke (1998) defined a system risk as “the likelihood that a firm’s
information systems are insufficiently protected against certain kinds of damage or loss”
(p. 441). Risk can also be defined as “A measure of the extent to which an entity is
threatened by a potential circumstance or event, and typically a function of: (i) the
adverse impacts that would rise if the circumstance or event occurs; and (ii) the
likelihood of occurrence” (NIST, 2018, p.46). A cybersecurity risk stems from the
interaction of these systems with cyberspace (Von Solms & Van Niekerk, 2013). One
challenge faced by VSEs is that of data breaches. Criminals target businesses to gain
access to consumer data including credit card information by way of Point-of-Sale (POS)
systems connected to the Internet. This information is then used to commit fraud or
identity theft (Conner, 2013; Pragati, 2015; Strauss, 2015).
In 2013, criminals stole credit card and debit payment information of over 70
million Target consumers through the payment card system (Plachkinova & Maurer
2018; Zioboro, 2014). Home Depot and Supervalu also reported similar breaches in 2014
(Banjo, 2014; Sidel, 2014). The theft of personal financial information results in the
merchant, the consumer, or a financial institution facing negative or costly ramifications
(Gordon & Loeb, 2002; Son, 2011). A data breach resulting in loss of consumer personal
financial information can cause a merchant to experience damage to their reputation as
well as an unforeseeable recovery time, however, very little is discussed in the popular
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media on the significant breaches going on in VSEs (Kauffman et al., 2011). Requiring
businesses to follow information security standards can help to facilitate cybersecurity
responsibility and reduce data breaches (Coburn, 2010). This study developed a
classification methodology and classify VSEs’s potential to fall victim to a data breaches
based on their cybersecurity social responsibility as well as their risk of data breach.

Problem Statement
The research problem that this study addressed is the failure to prevent data
breaches, particularly in VSEs (Bhattacharya, 2011; Hovav & Gray, 2014; Shim, 2011).
According to Berry & Berry (2018), VSEs lack information technology (IT) resources
and knowledge and, as a result, are at great risk for having their systems.
In the United States (U.S.) there is no standard definition of a VSE or Small
Enterprises. The U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA) offered different
classifications to determine eligibility for SBA assistance and financing. According to the
SBA (2014), a Small Enterprises may have no more than 500 employees for most
manufacturing industries and less than $7.5 million in annual returns for many nonmanufacturing industries, which appears to be very large when it comes to cybersecurity
related issues. Thus, this study adopted the European Commission's definition of a small
enterprise as those enterprises that employ fewer than 50 persons and whose annual
turnover or annual balance sheet total does not exceed €10 million (~ $11.8 million)
(Commission, 2016).
Data breaches are not limited to large organizations, however, there is a void on
IS security research on cybersecurity in VSEs (Groner & Brune, 2012; Gupta &
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Hammond, 2005; O’Rourke, 2019). This may result from an evolution in cybercrime,
where in prior years cybercriminals targeted larger organizations. As these organizations
heightened their cybersecurity measures, cyber-attacks shifted to smaller companies
(Bhattacharya, 2011). VSEs are especially exposed to data breaches because they tend to
be less equipped to handle complex security issues due to a smaller structure and limited
IS expertise (Cragg et al., 2011; Harris & Patten, 2014). VSEs tend to have limited
resources, unqualified personnel and, a thorough understanding of the risk of a data
breach (ENISA, 2016). In the event of a data breach, VSEs can face exorbitant costs that
put them at risk of going out of business. A cyber-attack in 2014 cost t-shirt manufacturer
80stees.com over $200,000 to resolve the issue (Berr, 2014).
Lorenzo-Molo and Udani (2013) defined responsibility as “the condition of being
responsible or accountable” (p. 124). The corporate social responsibility (CSR) theory
implies that organizations are not only responsible to immediate stakeholders, but instead
to the wider society (Carroll & Shabana, 2010). While companies strive for economic
gains, they also have a duty to balance social and economic responsibility (Hovav &
Gray, 2014). Many definitions of CSR have surfaced over the years, however, one
definition by Carroll (1979), has been widely used in research for the last three decades.
Carroll (1979) defined CSR as “the social responsibility of a business encompasses the
economic, legal, ethical, and discretionary expectations that society has of organizations
at a given point in time” (p. 500).
Following credit card data breaches such as the Target Corporation, data breach in
2013, corporations are being motivated to implement the Europay, Mastercard, and Visa
(EMV) standard for authenticating debit and credit card transactions (Gray & Ladig,
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2015). The EMV technology uses a chip to securely store cardholders’ data, however,
variants of these hybrid credit and debit cards are still susceptible to data breaches
because they possess both the magnetic stripe as well as EMV chip technology
(Ogundele et al., 2012). The Payment Card Industry (PCI) Data Security Standard (DSS)
exists to guide retailers in safeguarding against data breaches, however, without legal
enforcement, they are not always utilized (Hovav & Gray, 2014; Morse & Raval, 2008).
Park (2019), suggests that information security law is necessary, however, there are
challenges such as effectively assessing damages or proving that an organization that was
subject to a data breach took the necessary precautions. Moreover, in general, the risk
involved in such breaches is normally transferred to the consumer, credit card issuer, or
processor. According to Hovav and Gray (2014), even though the merchant may be the
source of the breach; the consumer, or credit card issuer tend to experience the brunt of
the punitive and financial damages, with fines being imposed on the processors and not
the merchants. While the standards imposed by credit card companies may facilitate
secure financial transactions, the implementation of these standards is not government
mandated (Morse & Raval, 2008; Park, 2019). As such, it is unclear how VSEs are
encouraged to invest in cybersecurity preventative measures and/or comply with PCIDSS standards, thus, warranting additional research on the role of VSE’s responsibility in
the context of cybersecurity as well as the VSEs’ RDB.

Relevance and Significance
The increasing use of computing technology and their interconnectivity with the
Internet places organizations who store or transmit sensitive information at risk to data
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breaches (Gordon et al., 2014; Jang-Jaccard & Nepal, 2014; Shim, 2011). This study is
relevant, as VSEs play an important role in the U.S. economy and supply chain
(SBA.gov). VSEs often they perceive themselves to be exempt from cyber-attacks,
however, they are particularly at risk of data breaches due to the sensitive information
they store and transmit, while having limited investment in cybersecurity
countermeasures (Bhattacharya, 2011; Harris & Patten, 2014). In the event of a data
breach, these VSEs can face financial costs, tarnished reputation, or loss of customers
(Gordon & Loeb, 2002; Kauffman et al., 2011; Son, 2011).
A great number of IS cybersecurity research studies focus on large organizations
with few studies being conducted on cybersecurity in smaller organizations (Gafni &
Pavel, 2019). Therefore, the significance of this study is that it adds to the body of
knowledge regarding social responsibility and the role it plays in preventing data breach
in VSEs.

Dissertation Goals
The main goal of this research was to develop and validate a cybersecurity riskresponsibility taxonomy for VSEs’ owners’ perceived cybersecurity social responsibility
(CySR) and risk of data breach (RDB) in order to classify their business level of exposure
to a data breach. This dissertation developed on previous research by Hovav and Gray
(2014), who studied the T.J. Maxx breach of 2006, and suggested that VSEs have an
ethical responsibility to safeguard private information through CSR. According to Perrini
et al. (2011), the rejection of CSR can limit an VSE’s understanding of their surrounding
environment and consequently result in a loss of business opportunities. According to the
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Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (2011), a break down in the standards of
responsibility, as well as ethics, caused a financial crisis resulting in loss of trust in the
financial system by investors, businesses, and the general public. In the finance sector
after the Enron scandal and subsequent recession, CSR became recognized as a necessity
to support sustainable business by promoting socially responsible business practices as
well as ethical management practices (Holzer & Junglas, 2013). CSR research tends to
focus on large organizations, however, it appears that there is a void in CSR research on
VSEs (Fassin et al., 2011). As a result, the focus of this study was on cybersecurity social
responsibility in VSEs.
This dissertation extends beyond identifying technological solutions for
mitigating IS security risks to investigate the role of VSEs’ owner’s perceived CySR and
RDB. According to Spears and Barki (2010), the existing efforts to understand and
manage IS security risks tend to focus on technological areas rather than non-technical
sources such as personnel, policies, processes, as well as culture. In addition, Soomro et
al. (2016), suggest that a more holistic approach involving managers and human
contribution in general can impact organizational performance. IS security can be deemed
as a technical or behavioral organizational issue, however, technical efforts alone are
unable to identify the behavioral causes of a data breach. As such, studies that support the
framework outside of the IS discipline are necessary to understand the impact of behavior
on IS security (Choo, 2011; Julisch, 2013; Kaur, 2016; Posey et al., 2014).
This study was built on four specific goals. The first specific goal of this research
used a team of Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) using the Delphi methodology in order to
identify key characteristics for VSEs’ owners’ perceived RDB, and seperatly, to identify
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key characteristics for CySR. To measure CSR, other researchers have used the Kinder,
Lydenberg, and Domini (KLD) ratings, while others have developed survey instruments
(Carroll & Shabana, 2010). Given that CSR measure in cybersecurity does not appear to
exist in literature, this study used the Delphi method with the team of SMEs to design a
survey instrument for measuring CSR (Ramim & Lichvar, 2014). The second goal of this
research was to identify the factors for VSEs RDB and CySR. Doing so, allowed the
development of the grouping of categories (i.e. factors) of the key characteristics for each
of the constructs (RDB & CySR) in order to develop the aggregated scores for
classification of the level of exposure to a data breach. The third goal of this research was
to collect data from 100 VSEs and plot the aggregated scores of VSEs’ owner’s perceived
CySR and RDB on the cybersecurity risk-responsibility taxonomy (Figure 1). The fourth
goal was to assess whether significant differences exist in VSEs’ owners’ perceived
CySR and RDB based on type of industry, implementation of EMV chip technology, and
compliance with PCI-DSS using the cybersecurity risk-responsibility taxonomy.
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Figure 1
Cybersecurity Risk-Responsibility Taxonomy for Classifying VSE’s Level of Exposure to
a Data Breach

Research Questions
The main research question this study addressed was: what characteristics SMEs
consider important for developing the measures of CySR and RDB, along with how are
VSEs classified in the cybersecurity risk-responsibility taxonomy? The specific research
questions for this study are:
RQ1a What specific characteristics will be identified by SMEs as being important for
VSEs owners’ perceived RDB?
RQ1b What specific characteristics will be identified by SMEs as being important for
VSEs owners’ perceived CySR?
RQ2a What will be the significant factors for VSEs owners’ perceived RDB?
RQ2b What will be the significant factors for VSEs owners’ perceived CySR?
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RQ3

How will the aggregated scores of 100 VSEs for the measures CySR and RDB be
positioned on the cybersecurity risk-responsibility taxonomy?

RQ4a Will significant differences exist in VSEs owners’ perceived RDB based on three
demographics: (1) type of industry, (2) implementation of EMV chip technology,
(3) compliance with PCI-DSS?
RQ4b Will significant differences exist in VSEs owners’ perceived CySR based on three
demographics: (1) type of industry, (2) implementation of EMV chip technology,
(3) compliance with PCI DSS?

Barriers and Issues
This research study was faced with barriers and issues. One issue of concern is
that some members of the chosen expert review panel did not provide helpful or
constructive responses. They were provided with open-ended questions on the survey
instrument and encouraged elaborate further on their quantitative selections. Another
issue was that the overall views of the experts was limited to the panel members that are
selected. Therefore, using the Delphi technique, literature review, and pilot study
alleviated this issue.
The survey instrument itself was also a possible barrier, in that, it may be viewed
as long and drawn out, which could result in fewer responses than desired. To combat
this, face to face and phone interviews were conducted whenever possible.
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Definitions of terms
The following represent terms and definitions.
Corporate Social Responsibility – “The social responsibility of a business encompasses
the economic, legal, ethical, and discretionary expectations that society has of
organizations at a given point in time” (Carroll, 1979, p. 500).
Cyber-attack – “An attack, via cyberspace, that targets an enterprise’s use of cyberspace
for the purpose of disrupting, destroying, or maliciously controlling a computer
environment/infrastructure; destroying the integrity of the data; or stealing controlled
information” (NIST, 2012, pp. B-3).
Cybersecurity – “A computing-based discipline involving technology, people,
information, and processes to enable assured operations in the context of adversaries. It
involves the creation, operation, analysis, and testing of secure computer systems” (Joint
Task Force on Cybersecurity Education, 2017 p. 16). Or “Prevention of damage to,
protection of, and restoration of computers, electronic communications systems,
electronic communications services, wire communication, and electronic communication,
including information contained therein, to ensure its availability, integrity,
authentication, confidentiality, and nonrepudiation” (DOD, 2017, p. 58).
Cyberspace – “A global domain within the information environment consisting of the
interdependent network of information technology infrastructures, including the Internet,
telecommunications networks, computer systems and embedded processors and
controllers” (DOD, 2017, p. 58).
Data Breach – the compromise of electronic data by way of the Internet that results in
unauthorized access to personal identifiable information (Whitehouse.gov, 2015).
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Personal Identifiable Information – Any information about an individual that can be
used to distinguish or trace an individual's identify and any other information that is
linked or linkable to an individual (NIST, 2018, p. 1).
Risk – “A measure of the extent to which an entity is threatened by a potential
circumstance or event, and typically a function of: (i) the adverse impacts that would
arise if the circumstance or event occurs; and (ii) the likelihood of occurrence” (NIST,
2018, p. 46). Or “Organizations of all types and sizes face internal and external factors
and influences that make it uncertain whether and when they will achieve their
objectives. The effect this uncertainty has on an organization's objectives is “risk” (ISO,
2018).
Systems Risk – “the likelihood that a firm's information systems are insufficiently
protected against certain kinds of damage or loss” (Straub & Welke, 1998, p. 144)
Threat – “A threat is any circumstance or event with the potential to adversely impact
organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, or the Nation
through an information system via unauthorized access, destruction, disclosure, or
modification of information, and/or denial of service” (NIST, 2012, p. B-3).
Vulnerability – “A weakness in a system that can be exploited to violate the system’s
intended behavior relative to safety, security, reliability, availability, and integrity or to
obtain access to some asset” (Andrews & Whittaker, 2004, p. 70).

Summary
Chapter One described the research problem, research goals, relevance and
significance, as well as barriers and issues of this research study. The research problem
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that this study addressed is the failure to prevent data breaches, particularly in VSEs.
Literature outlining the problem and justifying the need for this study was presented.
The main goal of this research was to develop and validate a cybersecurity riskresponsibility taxonomy using VSEs owners’ perceived CySR and RDB for classification
of the VSEs base on their level of exposure to data breach. A definition of the research
questions was presented in this chapter. The main research question: what characteristics
SMEs consider important for developing the measures of CySR and RDB, along with
how are VSEs classified in the cybersecurity risk-responsibility taxonomy? The relevance
and significance of the study as well as barriers and issues were also discussed. Finally, a
list of definitions of terms to be used throughout the study was presented.
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Chapter 2
Review of the Literature

The following is a literature review derived from relevant research studies
appropriate to cybersecurity, risk of data breach, corporate social responsibility, data
breaches, and risk mitigation in small enterprises.
Cybersecurity
The need for IS security and in particular, cybersecurity, is becoming far more
widespread and of tremendous importance as data breaches become more prevalent (Van
Niekerk & Von Solms, 2010; Von Solms & Van Niekerk, 2013). According to Chopra
and Chaudhary (2020), the securing of personal information stored by individuals as well
as organizations is important especially in the banking transactions where the use of debit
and credit cards are prevalent. The overall intent of cybersecurity is to safeguard the
Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability (CIA) of information systems on the Internet
(Von Solms & Van Niekerk, 2013). The term cybersecurity is frequently used in
academic and business literature, as well as, the news media. However, many definitions
for cybersecurity exist, therefore, a concise definition capturing the multidimensional
nature of cybersecurity is necessary (Craigen et al., 2014). Early definitions for
cybersecurity focused on primarily securing computers and computer networks,
particularly from a defense viewpoint while more recent definitions include human
interactions, policies, training, risk management and, awareness. The Joint Task Force
(JTF) on Cybersecurity Education (2017), defined cybersecurity as “A computing-based
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discipline involving technology, people, information, and processes to enable assured
operations in the context of adversaries. It involves the creation, operation, analysis, and
testing of secure computer systems” (p. 16). Craigen et al. (2014), used a shortlist of nine
definitions found in literature to identify dominant themes in cybersecurity to define
cybersecurity as “the organization and collection of resources, processes, and structures
used to protect cyberspace and cyberspace-enabled systems from occurrences that
misalign de jure from de facto property rights”. Jang-Jaccard and Nepal (2014) described
cybersecurity as being “concerned with the understanding of surrounding issues of
diverse cyber-attacks and devising defense strategies (i.e., countermeasures) that preserve
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of any digital and information technologies”
(p.974). Von Solms and Van Niekerk (2013) distinguished between cybersecurity and
information security. According to von Solms and van Niekerk (2013), “cybersecurity
goes beyond the boundaries of traditional information security to include not only the
protection of information resources, but also that of other assets, including the person
him/herself” (p. 97). As seen with the definitions of cybersecurity, research studies also
show that technological solutions for cybersecurity by themselves are not entirely
effective in engaging cybersecurity, as such, policies and laws for software development
and practices are necessary (Kosseff, 2018).
Cybersecurity Threats & Cyber-Attacks
A cybersecurity threat is frequently the result of Internet-based activities and may
affect those technologies connected directly or indirectly to computers and networks. The
use of popular software products over the Internet creates opportunities for attack on
information systems and assets that results in enterprises suffering from financial losses
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and other negative consequences (Galbreth & Shor, 2010). The Internet provides
numerous benefits for nations who openly engage with each other by means of
Information and Communication Technologies (ICT), however, this creates a prime
opportunity for cyber-attacks. A cyber-attack is an attack carried out in cyberspace and,
“targets an enterprise’s use of cyberspace for the purpose of disrupting, destroying, or
maliciously controlling a computer environment/infrastructure; destroying the integrity of
the data; or stealing controlled information” (NIST, 2012, pp. B-3). With cyberspace
comes no geographical borders and, in turn, extends the field for criminals to carry out
cyber-attacks (Choo, 2011; Jang-Jaccard & Nepal, 2014). In addition, unlike a physical
attack which takes place in a single physical location, a cyber-attack extends beyond
organizational and geographical boundaries thus its impact is more far-reaching (Hovav
& Gray, 2014).
According to Hui, et al. (2017), attackers are motivated by incentives and are
strategic in choosing who to attack. As a result, very small enterprises have been the
prime targets. In 2015 cyber-attacks on both large and small enterprises cost the global
economy $575 billion, with malware being the most popular attack tool with 430 million
new and unique malware pieces (Symantec, 2016). In 2018 the most popular attack tool
was formjacking which saw cyber criminals targeting payment card data on ecommerce
sites. Broadcom (2019), reported 4,818 different websites were compromised with
formjacking each month in 2018. The Attacks on information systems have been the
subject of research for some time. Loch, et al., (1992) reported that companies who used
telecommunications to share information and other resources understood the threat of a
security breach, however, they believed that the potential of an attack was low. Studies
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on cyber threats and attacks focus on deterrence as a means of preventing them.
Organizations may face different types of threats are direct or indirect in nature, which
poses a challenge to identify and prepare for possible indirect threats (Ilvonen &
Virtanen, 2013).
Data Breach
A data breach may occur as a result of personally identifiable confidential
information such as names, social security numbers, date of birth, telephone numbers,
vehicle information, IP addresses, and credit card information being acquired through
unauthorized access via theft or accident. The effect of a data breach is felt by
organizations and individuals. According to Sen and Borle (2015), in the U.S. a single
data breach can cost organizations as much as $5.9 million. The privacy rights
clearinghouse has been reporting on data breaches affecting consumers in the U.S. dating
back to 2005. Since 2005, 9,016 data breach incidents have been reported in the U.S.
(Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, 2019). In the year 2019, there were 3,950 confirmed data
breaches across 81 (Verizon, 2020). The frequency and magnitude of data breaches have
continued to increase over the years. According to Symantec (2016), in 2015 there were
nine mega breaches that included the largest breach ever to be publicly reported by a U.S.
healthcare provider Anthem, which had 78 million patient records stolen. In addition to
disruption, a data breach incident can result in tangible or intangible costs to the breached
organizations that can inhibit the firm’s financial performance (Ko & Dorantes, 2006;
Ponemon, 2020). These breaches result in the merchant, consumer or financial
institutions facing undesirable consequences (Gordon et al., 2014; Son, 2011). According
to Sinanaj and Zafar (2016), reputation is significantly impacted by data breach
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announcements. Reports show businesses such as Target, and Home Depot, Capital One,
being the victims of such incidents (Banjo, 2014; Barrett, 2019; Zioboro, 2014). As such,
organizations are faced with the task of employing countermeasures aimed at preventing
data breaches.
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Table 1
Data Breaches reported since 2010
Year of Breach

Total number of Data Breaches

2010

140,937,393

2011

447,901,379

2012

298,766,833

2013

158,789,584

2014

1,313,623,927

2015

318,837,458

2016

4,815,012,420

2017

2,051,817,513

2018

1,370,710,973

Countermeasures
The ability to prevent or protect themselves from cyber-attacks and data breaches
is one of the biggest issues organizations are faced with (Baskerville et al. 2018; Gupta &
Hammond, 2005; Jang-Jaccard & Nepal, 2014). Countermeasures help to lessen the
impact of such data breaches (Sawik, 2013; Viduto et al., 2012). Technical and
operational countermeasures prevent physical access, as well as, those that block virtual
access to networks and computers (Rees et al., 2011). Technical countermeasures include
those controls that are built into hardware, software, and firmware. These technical
countermeasures may include identification, authentication, and intrusion detection
software while operational countermeasures are those controls that are managerial or
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procedural such as security policies and operational procedures (Blank & Gallagher,
2012). Research shows that data breach laws can have an impact on data breach
depending on the level and region. According to Sen and Borle (2015), the strictness of
state-level data breach security laws is correlated with reduced RDB. Data breach
disclosure laws reduce identity theft, however, there is no significant relationship
between the strictness of laws on identity theft, nor in regions of higher population
(Romanosky et al., 2011).
Cybersecurity standards and guidelines are meant to enhance cybersecurity.
Standards are fundamental in safeguarding an organization’s information assets from the
threat of a data (Silva et al., 2016). According to Smith et al. (2010), the use of a standard
as the basis for securing information systems against unwarranted attacks that can
compromise their operation, is fundamental to the process of implementing and
accrediting organizations’ security. Srinivas et al. (2018), also argue that standards play a
critical role in information security and recommend that decision makers encourage the
use of standards in both public and private sectors.
Siponen and Willison (2009) also highlighted the need to understand information
security standards, stating that, while guidelines are good, it is important to encourage
compliance through standards. There are numerous standards aimed at specifying or
recommending control measures, including ISO/IEC 27000 family, British Standard
7799, NIST Special Publication 800–53, the Graham–Leach–Bliley Act of 1999, and the
North American Electric Reliability Council's Urgent Action Standard 1200 (Hui et al.,
2012; Rees et al., 2011). However, standards by themselves have not proven to be
sufficient, nor applicable for VSEs (Fenz et al., 2011; Rees et al., 2011; Silva &
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Backhouse, 2003). Therefore, it is recommended that organizations include risk
management as a method to warrant information systems security, especially for small
and VSEs (Webb et al., 2014).
Table 2
Summary of Cybersecurity Studies
Study

Methodology

Sample

Instrument or
Construct

Baskerville et
al., 2018

Survey/Empiri
cal analysis

9721 French
firms

System
integration and
spend for
cybersecurity
countermeasur
es

Choo, 2011

Literature
Review

Craigen et al.,
2014

Literature
review and
expert analysis
Conceptual

None

Cybersecurity
definitions

Two
companies

Market share
and the
likelihood of
an attack

Galbreth &
Shor, 2010

Main Finding
or
Contribution
There is a
positive
correlation
between IS
integration and
the spend for
security
countermeasur
es
It is essential
for
governments,
businesses and
research
institutions to
quickly invest
and create
strategies and
solutions for
cybersecurity
A concise
definition of
cybersecurity
Popular
software
products offer
more potential
for attacks
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Table 2
Summary of Cybersecurity Studies (Cont)
Study

Methodology

Sample

Instrument or
Construct

Main Finding
or
Contribution

Gordon et al.,
2014

Empirical
analysis

None

Level of
cybersecurity
activity
expenditures
and the
probability of a
cybersecurity
breach

Gupta &
Hammond,
2005

Survey

138 small
businesses

Written
security policy,
security breach
experience,
concern about
virus-related
problems

Hovav & Gray,
2014

Case
Study/Analysis

One case

TJX security
breach

Ilvonen &
Virtanen, 2013

Literature
review and
scenario
analysis

Three cyber
Types of
threat scenarios challenges
posed on
information
security
challenges and
preparation
techniques

Cybersecurity
underinvestme
nt poses a
serious threat
to the national
security and to
the economic
prosperity of a
nation
Small business
owners may
have
procedures in
place to
counteract an
information
security threat,
however, their
effectiveness is
uncertain
Cyber-attacks
go beyond the
attacked
organization to
the society
The
formulation of
policies from a
threat/scenario
perspective
could
effectively
manage
information
security within
a company
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Table 2
Summary of Cybersecurity Studies (Cont.)
Study

Methodology

Jang-Jaccard &
Nepal, 2014

Discussion

Ko &
Dorantes, 2006

Comparative

Levy et al.,
2013

Survey/Empiri
cal Analysis

Sample

Instrument or
Construct
Cybersecurity
vulnerabilities
and emerging
threats

19 firms that
had security
breaches
related to
confidential
data
519 university
business
students

Financial
performance,
total assets,
annual sales,
and number of
employees
Attacks on the
server, email
interception,
unauthorized
file sharing,
unauthorized
access, and
spoofing
attacks

Main Finding
or
Contribution
Emerging
technologies
present new
opportunities
for data
breaches
Information
security
breaches have
minimal longterm economic
impact
The majority of
participants
thought the
ethical severity
of e-learning
security attacks
were unethical
or very
unethical. A
small
percentage
found them to
be ethical or
somewhat
ethical
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Table 2
Summary of Cybersecurity Studies (Cont.)
Study

Methodology

Jang-Jaccard &
Nepal, 2014

Discussion

Ko &
Dorantes, 2006

Comparative

Romanosky et
al., 2011

Empirical
analysis via
secondary data

Sample

Instrument or
Construct
Cybersecurity
vulnerabilities
and emerging
threats

19 firms that
had security
breaches
related to
confidential
data
Identity theft
reports
between 2002
and 2009

Financial
performance,
total assets,
annual sales,
and number of
employees
Log of identity
thefts,
disclosure laws,
adoption of
laws

Main Finding
or
Contribution
Emerging
technologies
present new
opportunities
for data
breaches
Information
security
breaches have
minimal longterm economic
impact
Data breach
disclosure laws
reduce identity
theft, however,
there is no
significant
relationship
between the
strictness of
laws on identity
theft, nor in
regions of
higher
population
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Table 2
Summary of Cybersecurity Studies (Cont.)
Study

Methodology

Sawik, 2013

Scenario based

Sen & Borle,
2015

Empirical
study

Sinanaj &
Zafar, 2016

Comparative

Sample

Instrument or
Construct
Threat,
countermeasure
, attack
scenario,
countermeasure
implementation
level

Information
on data
breach
incidents in
the U.S.
between 2005
and 2012

Opportunity
theory of crime,
the institutional
anomie theory

Main Finding
or
Contribution
The selection of
countermeasure
s is based on
their
effectiveness of
blocking
different
threats,
implementation
costs and
probability of
potential attack
scenarios
The strictness
of state-level
data breach
security laws is
correlated with
reduced risk of
data breach
Reputation is
significantly
impacted by
data breach
announcements
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Table 2
Summary of Cybersecurity Studies (Cont.)
Study

Methodology

Sample

Instrument
or Construct

Son, 2011

Survey

602 employees
in the United
States

Perceived
legitimacy,
value
congruence,
perceived
deterrent
certainty,
perceived
deterrent
severity and,
employees’
ISSP
compliance

Srinivas et al.,
2018

Discussion

Existing
literature

Van Nierkirk
& Von Solms,
2010

Exploratory
Study

Existing
literature

Corporate
culture,
information
security
culture

Main Finding
or
Contribution
Variables
rooted in the
intrinsic
motivation
model
contributed
significantly
more to the
explained
variance of
employees’
compliance than
did those rooted
in the extrinsic
motivation
model
Standards play a
critical role in
information
security and, as
such, decision
makers are
encouraged to
implement
standards in
both public and
private sectors.
Presented a
conceptual
model which
could assist in
improving the
understanding
of an
information
security culture
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Table 2
Summary of Cybersecurity Studies (Cont.)
Study

Methodology

Von Solms &
Van Nierkirk,
2013

Exploratory
Study

Sample

Instrument
or Construct
Scenarios and
examples

Main Finding
or
Contribution
Highlights the
difference
between
cybersecurity
and information
security

Risk
Risks in an organization can be in the form of natural disasters, security breaches,
or financial failure. A risk may have one or more causes and, if it occurs, one or more
impacts. The National Institute of Standards and Technology NIST (2012) defined risk as
“a measure of the extent to which an entity is threatened by a potential circumstance or
event, and is typically a function of: (i) the adverse impacts that would arise if the
circumstance or event occurs; and (ii) the likelihood of occurrence” (p. 12).
Risk Management
The process of identifying risks and applying the appropriate countermeasures is
known as Risk Management (Spears & Barki, 2010). According to Spears and Barki
(2010) greater awareness of security risks and controls contributes to

improvements in design and implementation as well as performance. Information
security risk management ensures that all possible threats and vulnerabilities, as well as
the valuable assets, are taken into consideration (Fenz et al., 2011). This process is
generally initiated by top management within organizations, however, managers are
oftentimes unaware of how to deal with IS security risks (Straub & Welke, 1998). In
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addition, managers are often times not committed to IS security (Hu, et al., 2012;
Puhakainen & Siponen, 2010; Smith et al., 2010). Therefore, it is suggested that IS
research focus on risk management guidelines to develop key principles aimed at aiding
in the prevention of IS security data breaches and in turn help to manage information
security (Dhillon & Backhouse, 2001).
Information Systems Security Risk
Straub and Welke (1998) defined an IS security risk as “the likelihood that a
firm's information systems are insufficiently protected against certain kinds of damage or
loss” (p. 441). In differentiating between a threat and a risk, Schneier (2006) identified a
threat as “a potential way an attacker can attack a system” (p. 20), while a risk takes “into
consideration both the likelihood of the threat and the seriousness of a successful attack”
(p. 20). According to Straub and Welke (1998), risk in the IS field is “the uncertainty
inherent in doing business; technically it is the probability associated with losses (or
failure), multiplied by the dollar loss of the risk if realized” (p. 442). Research shows that
the existing efforts to understand and manage IS security risks tend to focus on
technological areas rather than non-technical sources such as personnel, policies,
processes, as well as culture (Spears & Barki, 2010; Cram et al., 2019). Studies on
cybersecurity risks focus on risk management by identifying countermeasures to
safeguard against risks from cyber-attacks (Mukhopadhyay et al., 2013; Rees et al., 2011;
Sawik, 2013). Other studies explore quantitative and qualitative risk analysis methods as
the basis for assessing IS security risks (Lee, 2014).
Risk of Data Breach
Companies become exposed to data breaches either as they engage in ecommerce
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activities or, with physical POS transaction and system running on computers connected
to the Internet. A risk of a cybersecurity data breach stems from the interaction of these
ISs with cyberspace (Von Solms & Van Niekerk, 2013) and, the likelihood that these
systems are insufficiently protected against damage or loss (Straub & Welke, 1998). A
data breach can result in the organization, consumer, or financial institutions facing
undesirable consequences (Gordon et al., 2014; Son, 2011). Therefore, many
organizations are placing the security of their ISs as a top priority, however, VSEs aren’t
(Webb et al., 2014).
Despite local state and federal laws regarding data breach notification and such,
incidents of data breaches continue to happen in the U.S. At the forefront of issues
resulting from a cyber-attack is concerns for privacy which extend beyond an
organization’s use of personal information to now include risk of data breaches (Culnan
& Williams, 2009). According to Culnan and Williams (2009), incorporating moral
responsibility in an organization’s culture can minimize the effects of a data breach.
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Table 3
Summary of Risk Studies
Study

Methodology

Sample

Culnan &
Williams, 2009

Discussion

ChoicePoint
and TJX data
breaches

Dhillon &
Backhouse,
2001

Discussion/Re
view of
literature

Fenz et al.,
2011

Case study

Two small to
medium
European
enterprises

Instrument or
Construct

Control
evaluation, risk
determination,
threat
probability
determination,
inventory, and
business
process
importance
determination

Main Findings
or Contribution
Incorporating
moral
responsibility
in an
organization’s
culture can
minimize the
effects of a
data breach
Information
systems
security
research is
moving away
from technical
viewpoint to a
more socioorganizational
perspective
Presented a
model for
supporting the
risk
management
process. A
subsequent
case study
proved this
methodology
to be beneficial
when
compared to
previous
methodologies
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Table 3
Summary of Risk Studies(Cont)
Study

Methodology

Sample

Gordon et al.,
2014

Empirical
analysis

GL model

Hu et al., 2012

Survey

75 university
students
enrolled in
MIS courses

Mukhopadhya
y et al., 2013

Literature
review and
analysis

Instrument or
Construct
Level of
cybersecurity
activity
expenditures
and the
probability of a
cybersecurity
breach
Behavioral
intention,
attitudes
towards
behaviors,
subjective
form,
perceived
behavioral
control,
perceived goal
orientation,
perceived top
management
participation
Business loss,
security failure
reporting,
security
element
failure,
organizational
issues

Main Findings
or Contribution
Cybersecurity
underinvestme
nt poses a
serious threat
to the national
security and to
the economic
prosperity of a
nation
Top
management
participation in
information
security can
influence
employee
compliance

The advocating
of cyberinsurance as a
way of
minimizing the
financial
impact of
financial losses
from a data
breach
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Table 3
Summary of Risk Studies (Cont)
Study

Methodology

Sample

Hu et al., 2012

Survey

75 university
students
enrolled in
MIS courses

Mukhopadhya
y et al., 2013

Literature
review and
analysis

Puhakeinen &
Siponen, 2010

Empirical –
action research

16 employees
and IS security
managers from
an electronic
information
application
development
company

Instrument or
Construct
Behavioral
intention,
attitudes
towards
behaviors,
subjective
form,
perceived
behavioral
control,
perceived goal
orientation,
perceived top
management
participation
Business loss,
security failure
reporting,
security
element
failure,
organizational
issues
Users attitude
toward IS
security issues

Main Findings
or Contribution
Top
management
participation in
information
security can
influence
employee
compliance

The advocating
of cyberinsurance as a
way of
minimizing the
financial
impact of
financial losses
from a data
breach
Compliance
training
coupled with
communication
is useful in
employee
compliance. In
addition, IS
security
supported by
top
management is
necessary to
support
compliance
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Table 3
Summary of Risk Studies (Cont)
Study

Methodology

Sample

Smith et al.,
2010

Canonical
action research

16 senior
information
systems
security
managers

Spears &
Barki, 2010

Exploratory
and Survey

Nine
Interviewees
and 228
members of
ISACA

Instrument or
Construct

Main
Findings or
Contribution
Episodic power There needs to
relations, rules be sufficient
of practice, and financial and
domination
managerial
resources to
effectively
implement
information
security
standards
Greater
User
awareness of
participation,
security risks
organizational
and controls
awareness,
businesscontributes to
improvements
aligned SRM,
control
in design and
development,
implementation
and control
as well as
performance
performance
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Social Responsibility
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR)
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) has been a topic of concern for a number
of years. The work of Bowen (1953) ensued from the belief that the several hundred
largest businesses were vital centers of power and decision-making and that the actions of
these firms touched the lives of citizens at many points. Bowen (1953) noted that CSR
“refers to the obligations of businessmen to pursue those policies, to make those
decisions, or to follow those lines of action which are desirable in terms of the objectives
and values of our society” (p. 6). Numerous philosophies and definitions have been
suggested over the years, mainly from different areas of study deriving different
meanings (Geva, 2003). CSR research has been challenging partly because it is difficult
to develop valid measures. Rather than utilizing what was previously suggested,
researchers tend to create their own measures which make it difficult to compare and
analyze different studies (Aupperle et al., 1985). Despite varying philosophies and
definitions, the premise of CSR is that companies have ethical and moral obligations to
society that, while not required, are expected (Carroll, 2004). CSR studies have been
conducted in different types of organizations to examine the relationship between CSR
and financial performance of an organization. Aras et al. (2010) found that while there is
no significant relationship between CSR and financial performance there was a
relationship between firm size and CSR.
Cybersecurity Social Responsibility (CySR)
Cybersecurity Social Responsibility (CySR) is derived from the CSR theory, which
implies that organizations are not only responsible to its direct stakeholders when it
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comes to protecting there is assets, but also to the wider society (Carlton & Levy, 2017;
Carroll & Shabana, 2010). Consumers become vulnerable to different kinds of data
breaches by dealing with organizations. In addition to achieving positive economic gains,
companies are also expected to demonstrate social responsibility and are, therefore,
responsible for safeguarding private information through CySR (Hovav & Gray, 2014).
Culnan and Williams (2009) also believed that it is the moral responsibility of the
organizations to ensure that necessary precautions are in place to prevent data breach
events, and that when an organization has a keen sense of moral responsibility it is more
likely to implement processes aimed at preventing data breaches from occurring.
According to Matwyshyn (2009), legal compliance does not equate to social
responsibility, companies have an ethical obligation to offer information security as a
moral duty. However, it appears that very little attention has been given in literature to
the aspect of CySR, let alone how to measure or quantify it, which is one of the key goals
of this study.
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Table 4
Summary of Corporate Social Responsibility Studies
Study

Methodology

Sample

Aras et al.,
2010

Content
analysis

Annual reports
of 40
companies

Aupperle et al.,
1985

Empirical
survey

Corporate
CEOs

Carlton &
Levy, 2017

Discussion

Carroll, 2004

Analysis

Instrument or
Construct
CSR disclosure
reports

Economic,
legal, ethical
and,
discretionary
responsibilities

Main Finding
or Contribution
While there is
no significant
relationship
between CSR
and financial
performance
there was a
relationship
between firm
size and CSR
Contributes an
empirical
research to test
CSR
definitions
Cybersecurity
skills are
necessary for
dealing with
Advanced
Persistence
Threats and
other cyber
threat
mitigation
Proposed a
pyramid for
global CSR
implying that
practice of
CSR influences
performance
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Table 4
Summary of Corporate Social Responsibility Studies (Cont.)
Study

Methodology

Sample

Geva, 2003

Comparative

Three CSR
models

Hovav & Gray,
2014

Case
Study/Analysis

One case

Matwyshyn,
2010

Analysis

Instrument or
Construct

TJX security
breach

The
relationship
between law
and business
ethics

Main Finding
or
Contribution
Social
responsibility
varies in
different means,
depending on
the CSR model
being explored
Cyber-attacks
go beyond the
attacked
organization to
the society
Legal
compliance
does not equate
to social
responsibility.
Companies
have an ethical
obligation to
offer
information
security as a
moral duty

Summary of What is Known and Unknown
The interaction with cyberspace puts organizations at risk to cyber threats and
attacks. These attacks vary in nature and span geographical boundaries thereby posing
varying challenges for organizations (Jang-Jaccard & Nepal, 2014; Hovav & Gray,
2014). A review of literature was conducted to examine the existing research on
cybersecurity, data breaches, risk management and, corporate social responsibility.
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While technical and operational countermeasures will lessen the impact of a data
breach, information security standards and laws are also needed to encourage strictness
and foster compliance (Kosseff, 2018; Silva et al., 2016). Risk management identifies and
implements the appropriate countermeasures. However, much of the existing risk
management techniques tend to focus on the technological areas rather than non-technical
(Spears & Barki, 2010; Cram et al., 2019).
It is a common misconception that large corporations are more likely to be at risk
of cyber-attacks and data breaches than smaller enterprises (Bhattacharya, 2015).
However, while the information from larger enterprises may be desirable, the lax security
practices of smaller enterprises make them desirable to cybercriminals (Gupta &
Hammond, 2005). According to the Verizon 2017 Data Breach Investigation Security
Report, small enterprises were the primary victims of data breaches.
VSEs are recognizing that they are at risk to cyber-attacks because hackers will
attack any susceptible target. However, while numerous VSEs acknowledge the necessity
of cybersecurity, they do not engage in preventative measures against cyber-attacks
(Berry & Berry, 2018). According to Raghavan et al. (2017), one of the reasons VSEs fail
to invest in cybersecurity is because they do not understand the associated costs as being
essential and necessary to keep their businesses operational. They also do not have the IT
expertise to implement the necessary countermeasures (Raghavan et al., 2017).
While small and medium size organizations outnumber their larger counterparts
globally, Cybersecurity and CSR research studies tend to focus on large organizations
(Gafni & Pavel, 2019). In addition, the role of responsibility in the IS research, in
particular, security related research studies have not been thoroughly explored.
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Furthermore, much of the research studies in the IS field around computer security and
not much on cybersecurity.
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Chapter 3
Methodology

Overview of Research Design
This study employed a quantitative approach for data collection and analysis.
Figure 2 depicts the research overview of the research design. Phase 1 of this research
study used Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) panel review process via the Delphi method to
review the initial characteristics of RDB and CySR from literature to provide their
qualitative feedback on the lists. The Delphi method is used to conduct complex research
studies where there isn’t sufficient understanding of a phenomenon using qualitative (for
list completeness) and quantitative approach (for criteria rankings) (Skinner et al., 2015).
There are instances where pretests and pilot tests are carried out but are often times not
validated, however, in IS research instrument validation is highly recommended in order
to strengthen the findings of the study (Straub, 1989). Therefore, Phase 2 of this study
utilized the SMEs validated criteria and rankings from the previous stage to conduct a
pilot test to further validate the instruments. Even skilled researchers are encouraged to
conduct pilot tests to avoid unexpected problems (Boudreau et al., 2001). The main goal
of this research was to develop and validate a cybersecurity risk-responsibility taxonomy
for VSEs owners’ perceived CySR and RDB. Therefore, the final quantitative phase of
this research study (Phase 3) conducted data analysis and taxonomy development.
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Figure 2:
Overview of the Research Design
Inputs, Results, and
Contributions
Review of Literature
Proposed Criteria for RDB
Proposed Criteria for CySR

Proposed Research
Study
Expert Panel
Review of
instructions and
instruments to
measure RDB
characteristics
and CySR
characteristics

Delphi

Analysis of
Expert Panel
Responses

Delphi

Phase 2

Expert Validated instrument
for RDB & CySR
RQ1a & RQ2a

Phase 1

Pilot Sample
Selection

Quantitative
Pilot Data
Analysis

Phase 3
Minor adjustments to
Instrument

Main Data
Collection

RQ2a, RQ2b, RQ3, RQ4a,
RQ4b

Pre-Analysis Data
Screening

Cybersecurity RiskResponsibility
Taxonomy
Development and
Data Analysis

Conclusions and
Recommendation

Instrument Development
The first step in developing the instruments for this study was to develop a
thorough list of initial characteristics and factors for RDB and CySR. As shown in Table
5, a review of the current literature on risk and data breaches was used to establish the
characteristics and factors of RDB. Similarly, as shown in Table 6, the characteristics and
factors of CySR were drawn from current literature.
SMEs were asked to evaluate the list of characteristics for each construct and
provide feedback on removal, adjustments, and additions. Following the SME evaluation,
the original list of characteristics were finalized using the feedback from the SMEs.
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Table 5
RDB factors and characteristics.
Risk of Data Breach (RDB)
Factors
External Risk from Cybercriminals

Risk of Data Breach (RDB) Characteristics
ü
ü
ü
ü
ü

Internal Risk from Users (Insider’s
Threat such as disgruntled
employees or human error/mistake)

ü
ü
ü
ü
ü
ü

Risk of Physical Intruder/Thief

ü
ü
ü
ü

Lack of firewall software
Lack of intrusion detection systems
Lack of a password strength policy
Unencrypted transmission of cardholder
data
Lack of security awareness to social
engineering and phishing
Lack of malware protection
Lack of user knowledge and training
Improper access permission (e.g.
employees having unnecessary privilege)
Improper access to software
Lack of separation duties
Weak encryption or poor key-management
practices
Lack of physical monitoring
Insecure handling of payment terminals
Disposal of storage media with data
Unsupervised visitors such as vendors

Table 6
CySR factors and characteristics.
Cybersecurity Social
Responsibility (CySR) Factors
Economic CySR

Legal CySR

Cybersecurity Social Responsibility
(CySR) Characteristics
ü The organization is successful at
maximizing profits
ü The organization strives to lower
operating costs
ü Owners/managers try to establish longterm strategies for the organization
ü Owners/managers are aware of
cybersecurity laws
ü Software products meet legal standards
ü Owners/managers try to comply with the
law

43

Table 6
CySR factors and characteristics (Cont.).
Cybersecurity Social
Responsibility (CySR) Factors
Ethical CySR

Discretionary CySR

Cybersecurity Social Responsibility (CySR)
Characteristics
ü The organization has a comprehensive
information security policy
ü The organization follows information
security standards
ü The organization is recognized as a
trustworthy company
ü A procedure is in place for employees to
report misconduct or misuse of
information systems
ü The organization tries to improve its
corporate image
ü The organization tries to improve the
perception of how it conducts business
ü The organization contributes to the
bettering of the local community

Validity and Reliability
The reliability and validity of a measurement instrument are vital and is the first line
of defense against inaccurate conclusions (Salkind, 2009). According to Creswell (2002),
reliability and validity of an instrument should provide “an accurate assessment of the
variable and enable the researcher to draw inferences to a sample or population” (p. 180).
There are two constructs in this study, CySR and, RDB, both are measured from the
perspective of the business owner or managers. The measurement instrument was
validated to ensure they measure what they intend to measure. According to Terrell
(2016), “a well-developed test must consistently measure what it’s intended to measure”
(p. 82). A panel of SMEs were used to ensure the validity of the proposed instruments
that were derived from previous research studies. The SMEs were requested to provide
feedback on the proposed instrument (Appendix B). According to McFadzean et al.
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(2011), the Delphi technique “ensures that the data collection process is both reliable and
valid because it exposes the investigation to differing, and often divergent, opinions and
seeks convergence through structured feedback” (p. 108). Therefore, in order to ensure
validity and reliability, this study will gather feedback from the SMEs to verify that the
proposed measures are appropriate to assess CySR and RDB. A pilot study was also
conducted using a sample of 20 VSEs to further verify the validity of the proposed
instrument.
Internal Validity
Salkind (2009) described internal validity as “the quality of an experimental design
such that the results obtained are attributed to the manipulation of the independent
variable” (p.231). Salkind (2006) stated that instrumentation is a possible threat because
“when the scoring of an instrument itself is affected, any change in the scores might be
caused by the scoring procedure, rather than the effects of the treatment” (p. 224). The
use of the expert panel via the Delphi method will ensure initial internal validity.
External Validity
According to Creswell (2002), “External validity threats arise when experimenters
draw incorrect inferences from the sample data to other persons, other settings, and past
and future situations” (p. 176). Prior to the main data collection, this study was conducted
with a small pilot group of the sample population. Additionally, the main data collection
was done amongst different groups with different demographical markers including the
type of industry, implementation of EMV chip technology, compliance with PCI-DSS.
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Sample
The unit of analysis for this research study is the assessment of results from VSEs
who utilize POS systems. About 400 companies were invited to participate in the study
from a list of small companies that conduct credit card transactions. With an anticipated
response rate of about 25%, a total of 100 participants were expected to take part in this
study.

Data Analysis
The responses were analyzed to detect accuracy, response set, missing data, and
outliers. This study addressed RQ1a and RQ1b via the Delphi methodology to identify
the instrument to measure RDB & CySR.
The aggregated scores for RDB and CySR were based on the Equations 1 and 2.
Eq.1:

RDB = (1/C1)*(w_A1*A1 + w_A2*A2 ... +w_Ax*Ax)

RDB has a range of 0-100, where x is the final number of item for the RDB construct, the
ws are the weights assigned to the items from the SMEs, as are the items for RDB
construct (See Appendix B), C1 is a constant coefficient to normalize the aggregated
score for RDB from 0 to 100.
Eq. 2:

CySR = (1/C2)*(w_B1*B1 + w_B2*B2 ... + w_By*By)

CySR has a range of 0-100, where y is the final number of item for the CySR construct,
ws are the weights assigned to the items from the SMEs, Bs are the items for RDB
construct (See Appendix B), C2 is a constant coefficient to normalize the aggregated
score for CySR from 0 to 100.
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Resources
This research study involved human subjects, therefore, the Institutional Review
Board (IRB) approval was needed to carry out this study. The Delphi technique expert
panel review process required access to cybersecurity professionals. In addition to the
above-mentioned resources, a computer, Internet access, Microsoft Word®, Microsoft
Excel®, Microsoft PowerPoint®, SPSS®, post office box, and email accounts was required
to carry out the study.

Summary
Chapter three provided the methodology overview that was used in this research study.
This study employed a sequential-exploratory mixed methods design using qualitative
phase followed by a quantitative data collection and analysis. This study was conducted
in three phases to ensure reliability and validity of the results. Phase 1 of the study used
SMEs to identify the characteristics for RDB and CySR via the Delphi method. Phase 2
involved a pilot test with a small sample of the population. The final phase 3 involved the
data analysis and taxonomy development.
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Chapter 4
Results

This chapter outlines the results of the data collection and data analysis for this
research study. The results for this study were completed in three phases. Phase 1 entailed
the data collection from the expert panel using the Delphi technique to review the initial
characteristics of RDB and CySR and to provide their qualitative feedback on the lists.
Phase 2 of this study utilized the SMEs validated criteria and rankings from the
previous stage to conduct a pilot test to further validate the instruments. Phase 3, the final
stage of this research study developed and validated a cybersecurity risk-responsibility
taxonomy for VSEs owners’ perceived CySR and RDB.

Data Analysis and Results
Expert Panel Review - Phase 1
The first step in developing the instruments for this study was to develop a
thorough list of initial characteristics for RDB and CySR. A review of the current
literature on IS risk and data breaches and cybersecurity social responsibility was used to
establish the characteristics and factors of RDB and CySR. SMEs were asked to evaluate
the list of characteristics for each construct and provide feedback on removal,
adjustments, and additions using google forms (See Appendix B). This phase of the study
took place between March and May 2019. A panel of 26 experts was targeted with 13
responding, representing 50% response rate. The agreement percentages ranged from
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69% to 100% for the questions that were presented to the SMEs. Following the SME
evaluation, the original list of characteristics was finalized using the feedback from the
SMEs. Table 7 represents the descriptive statistics of the expert panel members.

Table 7
SME Demographics (N=13)
Demographic Item

Frequency

Approximate
Percentage

1
1
2
4
4
1

7.7%
7.7%
15.4%
30.8%
30.8%
7.7%

5
4
4

38.5%
30.8%
30.8%

0
3
3
4
0
3

0%
23.1%
23.1%
30.8%
0.0%
23.1%

5
0
8
0

38.5%
0.0%
61.5%
0.0%

Age:
25-29
30-34
40-44
45-49
50-54
55-59
Industry:
Academic
Government/Military
Private Organization
Years of cybersecurity experience:
Less than 1 year
2-5 years
5-10 years
10-15 years
15-20 years
Over 20 years
Formal cybersecurity training or certification:
Training only
Certification only
Training and certification
No training or certification

The ages of the SMEs ranged from 25 to 59 years old, with the majority of SMEs
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aged 45 to 49 years old (4; 30.8%) and 50 to 54 years old (4; 30.8%). For type of
industry, SMEs 5 (38.5%) were in academia, 4 (30.8%) were government or military and,
4 (30.8%) identified as private organization. The majority of SMEs had 10-15 years of
cybersecurity experience (4; 30.8%) while 3 (23.1%) had over 20 years experience. For
cybersecurity training and certification, 8 (61.5%) achieved both training and certification
while the remaining 5 (38.5%) obtained training only.
Risk of Data Breach
SMEs were asked to provide a recommendation for keeping, adjusting, or removing
each of the proposed characteristics. SMEs were also encouraged to provide an
explanation for their recommendation if it involved removing or adjusting as well as
suggest additional characteristics to be included. The overall response from the SMEs
was that the characteristics remain as proposed. The consensus percentages for RDB
characteristics ranged from 85% to 100% with the exception of “Unencrypted
transmission of cardholder data” which had a 69% consensus. As a result, the
characteristic was changed to read “Unencrypted transmission of sensitive data”, as was
suggested.
Cybersecurity Social Responsibility
SMEs were asked to provide a recommendation for keeping, adjusting, or removing
each of the proposed characteristics. SMEs were also encouraged to provide an
explanation for their recommendation if it involved removing or adjusting as well as
suggest additional characteristics to be included. The overall consensus percentages for
RDB characteristics ranged from 85% to 100%. The SMEs who suggested adjusting as
their response provided no explanation of their recommendation, as a result no changes
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were made to the proposed characteristics.

Pilot Study – Phase 2
A total of 20 organizations participated in the pilot study for this research project.
The purpose of this pilot study was to further validate the instrument and detect problems
that could arise in the main study. The pilot study was conducted between June and
September 2019 via email solicitation, telephone, and face to face interviews using the
proposed survey instrument of the main study (see Appendix C). The pilot study
population included 20 organizations with number of employees ranging from less than
five to 50 total employees across seven different industries. The overall feedback from
the pilot study did not warrant major changes to the survey instrument. However, during
the interviews some organizations did not know how to respond to the question about
obtaining PCI-DSS and, as a result, a new option for “uncertain” was added to the
responses, as well as, an explanation of PCI-DSS.

Table 8
Demographics of the Pilot Study Population (N=20)
Demographic Item

Frequency

Percentage

4
6
6
2
2
0

20.0%
30.0%
30.0%
10.0%
10.0%
0.0%

Number of employees:
Less than 5 employees
6 to10 employees
11 to 20 employees
21 to 30 employees
31 to 50 employees
51 or more employees
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Table 8
Demographics of the Pilot Study Population (N=20) (Cont)
Demographic Item

Frequency

Percentage

1
4
2
4
6
2
1

5.0%
20.0%
10.0%
20.0%
30.0%
10.0%
5.0%

20
0

100%
0.0%

11
9

55.0%
45.0%

9
11

45.0%
55.0%

Industry:
Business Services
Food and Restaurant
General Retail
Health, Beauty and Fitness
Automotive Repair
Healthcare
Other
Credit Cards accepted:
Yes
No
Use of chip reader:
Yes
No
PCI-DSS compliant:
Yes
No
Main Data Collection – Phase 3
During this phase the modified survey instrument from the pilot study was used to
collect data from a larger set of organizations. Data collection took place between
September and December 2019. Approximately 400 organizations were selected and
contacted via email to participate in the study. 105 surveys were completed over the fourmonth period, constituting a response rate of 26%. Participation in the survey was
anonymous and participants were given the option of exploring cybersecurity resources
for small business on the Small Business Administration and the National Cybersecurity
Alliance’s website upon completion.
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Pre-Analysis Data Screening
This process was necessary to identify anomalies within the data collection and,
to ensure that the data is accurate and reliable (Levy, 2006). The responses for the main
data collection were gathered using Google Forms designed to eliminate errors and
missed questions during the process. The collected data was transferred to excel
worksheets and assigned a CaseID then visually inspected for incomplete or missed
responses. Following the initial data screening, 105 responses were deemed usable and
was loaded into SPSS for further pre-analysis data screening. Outlier detection was done
using Mahalanobis distance box plot and no extreme multivariate outliers were identified.
Exploratory Factor Analysis
To address RQ2a (What will be the significant factors for VSEs owners’
perceived RDB?) and, RQ2b (What will be the significant factors for VSEs owners’
perceived CySR?) the main data was subjected to EFA using PCA using varimax rotation
to extract factors of eigenvalue greater than one.
RDB Factor Analysis
The review of literature identified three factors for RDB; External Risk from
Cybercriminals (ERCC), Internal Risk from users (IRU) and, External Risk of Physical
Intruder/Thief (PIT). Exploratory factory analysis using PCA was conducted to identify
as many factors as suggested by the data. Three factors were produced which were
evaluated using eigenvalue, variance and, scree plot. The eigenvalue for the first factor
was 7.8, the second factor was 1.5 and the third factor three 1.0 indicating that all three
factors could be retained. After the varimax rotation, the first factor accounted for 52.4%
of the loading while the second factor accounted for 10% and the third factor accounted
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for 6.8% making the total variance 69.2% which was slightly lower than the
recommended 70% of total variability. Table 9 shows the eigenvalue and variance of
each factor.

Table 9
Eigenvalue and Variance for RDB
Factor
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

Total
7.862
1.509
1.022
0.801
0.74
0.673
0.482
0.42
0.384
0.261
0.238
0.206
0.162
0.134
0.106

% of Variance
52.415
10.059
6.813
5.341
4.933
4.488
3.215
2.799
2.559
1.74
1.584
1.373
1.079
0.894
0.709

Cumulative %
52.415
62.475
69.287
74.629
79.561
84.049
87.264
90.063
92.622
94.362
95.946
97.318
98.397
99.291
100

The scree plot (Figure 3) shows the plot leveling off after the third factor which
suggested that the first three factors could be retained. Cronbach’s Alpha reliability test
was done to further test the reliability of each factor.
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Figure 3
RDB Scree Plot

The Cronbach’s Alpha for each factor was 0.701 or higher, which indicates
reliability. The Cronbach’s Alpha for each factor was: External Risk from Cybercriminals
-0.898, Internal Risk from Users - 0.897, and Physical Risk from Outsiders - 0.701. The
Cronbach’s Alpha “if item is deleted” was calculated to further test the reliability of each
item. The results indicate minimal change to Cronbach’s Alpha of the second factor
(IRU) if item PIT_A15 (Unsupervised visitors such as vendors) was deleted, however,
based on literature and the expert panel review it was retained in the study. Table 10
represents the factor loadings and Cronbach’s Alpha for RDB.
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Table 10
RDB Factors resulting from PCA
RDB Factor Name

External Risk from
Cybercriminals

Internal Risk from
Users

Physical Risk from
Outsiders

Item

1

2

3

Cronbach's
Alpha if
Item
Deleted

ERCC_A5

0.811

0.030

0.270

0.881

ERCC_A1

0.752

0.346

0.072

0.874

ERCC_A3

0.742

0.435

0.050

0.871

ERCC_A4

0.728

0.211

0.104

0.890

ERCC_A2

0.723

0.458

0.004

0.877

ERCC_A6

0.678

0.215

0.456

0.885

IRU_A10

0.242

0.822

0.208

0.869

IRU_A9

0.254

0.721

0.307

0.874

IRU_A8

0.409

0.720

0.270

0.864

IRU_A7

0.532

0.710

0.022

0.872

PIT_A12

0.266

0.672

0.244

0.896

IRU_A11

0.496

0.651

0.244

0.868

PIT_A15

-0.109

0.502

0.465

0.911

PIT_A13

0.112

0.188

0.794

0.316
0.898

0.287
0.897

0.735
0.701

PIT_A14
Factor Cronbach's Alpha à

Upon completion of the data analysis for RDB, three factors comprised of 15
items were retained. The results of this analysis provided an answer to RQ2a: What will
be the significant factors for VSEs owners’ perceived RDB? Table 11 provides the final
list of RDB items aligned with their associated RDB factors and definitions.
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Table 11
List of RDB Items Grouped by Factor
Item

RDB
Factor

ERCC_A1
ERCC_A3
ERCC_A4
ERCC_A2

External Risk from
Cybercriminals

ERCC_A5

Owners Perceived RDB Characteristics
Lack of security awareness to social engineering and
phishing
Lack of firewall software
Lack of a password strength policy
Unencrypted transmission of cardholder data
Lack of intrusion detection systems
Lack of malware protection

IRU_A10

Lack of separation of duties

IRU_A9

Improper access to software

IRU_A8
IRU_A7
PIT_A12
IRU_A11

Internal Risk from Users

ERCC_A6

Improper access permission (e.g. employees having
unnecessary privilege)
Lack of user knowledge or training
Lack of physical monitoring
Weak encryption or poor key-management practices
Unsupervised visitors such as vendors

PIT_A13

Insecure handling of payment terminals

PIT_A14

Physical
Risk
from
Outsider
s

PIT_A15

Disposal of storage media with data

CySR Factor Analysis. Four factors were identified in the review of literature for CySR;
Economic CySR (EcCySR), Legal CySR (LCySR), Ehtical CySR (ECySR) and,
Discretionary CySR (DCySR), Exploratory factory analysis using PCA was conducted to
identify as many factors as suggested by the data. Initial factor analysis was conducted
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for four factors, then three factors, however, the eigenvalue suggested two factors with
values greater than one. A final analysis was conducted on two factors using eigenvalue,
variance and, scree plot. The eigenvalue for the first factor was 7.897 and the second
factor was 2.301, both meeting the eigenvalue criteria. After the varimax rotation, the
first factor accounted for 60.7% of the loading while the second factor accounted for
17.7% making the total variance 78.4% which was satisfies the criteria for at least 70% of
total variability. Table 12 shows the eigenvalue and total variance for the factors.
Table 12
Total Variance Explained
Factor
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13

Eigenvalue
7.897
2.301
0.691
0.47
0.433
0.341
0.242
0.191
0.154
0.097
0.082
0.073
0.027

% of Variance
60.748
17.697
5.317
3.616
3.334
2.621
1.861
1.468
1.188
0.748
0.634
0.562
0.206

Cumulative %
60.748
78.444
83.761
87.377
90.711
93.332
95.193
96.662
97.849
98.598
99.231
99.794
100

The scree plot (Figure 4) shows a steep descent for the first two factors, then the
plot leveling off after the second factor which suggested that the first two factors could be
retained.
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Figure 4
CySR Scree Plot

Cronbach’s Alpha reliability test was done to further test the reliability of each
factor. The Cronbach’s Alpha for each factor was 0.942 or higher, which indicates
reliability. The Cronbach’s Alpha for each factor was: Ethical Responsibility -0.942, and,
Legal Responsibility -0.944. The Cronbach’s Alpha “if item is deleted” was calculated to
further test the reliability of each item. Items ECySR_B1 and ECySR_B10 showed a
slight increase if deleted, however, based on literature and the expert panel
recommendation they were retained. Table 13 shows the factor loadings and Cronbach
Alpha for CySR.

59

Table 13
CySR Factors resulting from PCA

CySR Factor Name

Business
Responsibility

Item

Cronbach's
Alpha if
Item
Deleted

1

2

DCySR_B12

0.911

0.271

0.924

DCySR_B11

0.905

0.245

0.925

DCySR_B13

0.893

0.225

0.928

ECySR_B9

0.840

0.192

0.933

EcCySR_B3

0.821

0.255

0.934

EcCySR_B2

0.805

0.257

0.934

EcCySR_B1

0.559

0.516

0.950

0.189
0.228
0.168
0.320
0.335
0.247
0.942

0.914
0.899
0.891
0.869
0.855
0.692
0.944

0.926
0.926
0.933
0.928
0.930
0.955

ECySR_B7
ECySR_B8
LCySR_B4
Legal Responsibility
LCySR_B6
LCySR_B5
ECySR_B10
Factor Cronbach's Alpha à

Upon completion of the data analysis for CySR, two factors comprised of 13
items were retained. The results of this analysis provided an answer to RQ2b: What will
be the significant factors for VSEs owners’ perceived CySR? Table 14 provides the final
list of RDB items aligned with their associated CySR factors and definitions.
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Table 14
List of RDB Items Grouped by Factor
Item

CySR
Factor

DCySR_B11
DCySR_B13
ECySR_B9
EcCySR_B3
EcCySR_B2

Business Responsibility

DCySR_B12

CySR Characteristics
The organization tries to improve the perception of
how it conducts business
The organization tries to improve its corporate image
The organization contributes to the bettering of the
local community
The organization is recognized as a trustworthy
company
Owners/managers try to establish long-term strategies
for the organization
The organization strives to lower operating costs
The organization is successful at maximizing profits

ECySR_B7

The organization has a comprehensive information
security policy
The organization follows information security
standards
Owners/managers are aware of cybersecurity laws

ECySR_B8
LCySR_B4
LCySR_B6
LCySR_B5
ECySR_B10

Legal Responsibility

EcCySR_B1

Owners/Managers try to comply with the law
Software products meet legal standards
A procedure is in place for employees to report
misconduct or misuse of information systems
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Demographic Analysis
Following the pre-analysis data screening, the demographics of the participants of
the study were analyzed. The participants of the study were VSEs throughout the United
States of America. The participants varied across four demographics; number of
employees, industry, size, use of chip card readers and, PCI-DSS compliance. The
analysis of the number of employees within each organization showed that of the 105
participants, the majority (39 or 37.1%) employed between six and 10 employees, 27
VSEs or 25.7% employed 11 to 20 employees, 20 VSEs or 20%, 10 VSEs or 9.5%
employed between 31 to 50 employees), while eight VSEs or 7.7% employed between 31
and 50 employees. The participants of the study represented 11 different businesses
industries with the majority (16 or 15.2%) representing the automotive repair industry
and 12.4% identifying as “other”. 60 VSEs or 57.1% had terminals that could read credit
cards with EMV chip, while 45 or 42.9% did not have EMV chip technology. The data
also showed that 46 participants or 43.8% had not obtained PCI-DSS compliance, while
37 VSEs or 39.2% had obtained PCI-DSS compliance and, the remaining 22 or 21% was
uncertain about their PCI-DSS compliance status. The demographics of the population
are presented in Table 15.
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Table 15
Demographics of the Study Population (N=105)
Demographic Item

Frequency

Percentage

Number of employees:
Less than 5 employees
6 to10 employees
11 to 20 employees
21 to 30 employees
31 to 50 employees
51 or more employees

20
39
27
10
8
0

20.0%
37.1%
25.7%
9.5%
7.7%
0.0%

Industry:
Business Services
Food and Restaurant
General Retail
Health, Beauty and Fitness
Automotive Repair
Technology
Transportation
Construction
Manufacturing
Healthcare
Other

11
9
14
14
16
6
2
5
5
10
13

10.5%
8.6%
13.3%
13.3%
15.2%
5.7%
1.9%
4.8%
4.8%
9.5%
12.4%

Credit Cards accepted:
Yes
No

104
1

99.0%
1.0%

Use of chip reader:
Yes
No

60
45

57.1%
42.9%

PCI-DSS compliant:
Yes
No
Uncertain

37
46
22

35.2%
43.8%
21.0%

Data analysis was conducted on the sample of 105 VSEs. Table 16 provides the
descriptive statistics of the RDB and CySR variables. For RDB, the mean score was 0.74
and standard deviation 0.17 which indicated that the samples of VSEs have low overall
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owners perceived RDB. For CySR the mean score was 0.76 and standard deviation 0.13
which indicated that the overall CySR was low.
Table 16
Descriptive Statistics of RDB and CySR (N=105)
Variable

Minimum

Maximum

Mean

RDB
CySR

0.35
0.53

0.99
1.00

0.74
0.76

Std.
Deviation
0.17
0.13

For RQ3, the aggregated scores of 105 VSEs for the measures CySR and RDB
were positioned on the cybersecurity risk-responsibility taxonomy. Figure 5 shows the
sample of VSEs positioned on the taxonomy with VSE’s owners perceived RDB on the
horizontal axis and CySR on the vertical axis.
Demographic data was collected on the VSEs to address RQ4a and RQ4b. The
data was evaluated to determine if significant differences exist in VSEs owners’
perceived RDB (RQ4a) and, CySR (RQ4b) based on three demographics: (1) type of
industry, (2) implementation of EMV chip technology, (3) compliance with PCI-DSS?
One-way ANOVA was used to address RQ4.
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Figure 5
Cybersecurity Risk-Responsibility Taxonomy
Cybersecurity Risk Responsibility Taxonomy

Concern for Society

1.00

Lax

Engaged

Accountable

0.90

0.80

0.70

Concern for Economic Performance

Cybersecurity Social
Responsibility
(CySR)

0.60

0.50

0.40

0.30

Relaxed
0.30

Liable
0.40

0.50

0.60

Dependable
0.70

0.80

0.90

1.00

VSE’s Owners Perceived Risk of Data Breach
(RDB)

Industry
The descriptive statistics for RDB and CySR based on the type of industry is
shown in Table 17 with the respective means and standard deviations. The top three
highest VSE’s owners perceived RDB were healthcare (Mean = 0.92, Standard Deviation
0.06); technology (Mean = 0.85, Standard Deviation 0.17); and transportation (Mean =
0.82, Standard Deviation = 0.05). Construction (Mean = 0.66, Standard Deviation =
0.12); food and restaurant industry (Mean = 0.69, Standard Deviation =0.16); and those
industries identifying as “other” (Mean = 0.67, Standard Deviation = 0.20) were the
lowest VSEs owner’s perceived RDB. For CySR the healthcare (mean = 0.92, Standard
Deviation = 0.09); technology (Mean = 0.82 Standard Deviation = 0.18); and
transportation (Mean = 0.79, Standard Deviation = 0.15) were the three highest for CySR,
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while manufacturing (Mean = 0.70, Standard Deviation = 0.11); “other” (Mean = 0.70
Standard Deviation = 0.11); and construction (0.65, Standard Deviation = 0.06) were the
industries with the lowest CySR. Figure 6 shows the cybersecurity risk-responsibility
taxonomy by industry.

Table 17
Descriptive Statistics of RDB and CySR by Industry (N=105)
Industry

N

RDB
Mean
Std.
Deviation

CySR
Mean
Std.
Deviation

1. The Business Services
Industry
2. The Food and
Restaurant Industry
3. The General Retail
Industry
4. The Health, Beauty and
Fitness Industry
5. The Automotive Repair
Industry
6. The Technology
Industry
7. The Transportation
industry
8. The Construction
industry
9. The Manufacturing
industry
10. The Healthcare
industry
11. Other
Total

11

0.75

0.14

0.78

0.15

9

0.69

0.16

0.72

0.11

14

0.72

0.20

0.77

0.12

14

0.71

0.16

0.75

0.12

16

0.71

0.17

0.77

0.10

6

0.85

0.17

0.82

0.18

2

0.82

0.05

0.79

0.15

5

0.66

0.12

0.65

0.06

5

0.77

0.11

0.70

0.11

10

0.92

0.06

0.92

0.09

13
105

0.67
0.74

0.20
0.17

0.70
0.76

0.13
0.13
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Figure 6
Cybersecurity Risk-Responsibility Taxonomy by Industry (N=105)
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Figure 7
Means and Standard Deviations of RDB by Industry (N=105)
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Figure 8
Means and Standard Deviations of CySR by Industry (N=105)
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One-way ANOVA was used to determine whether there were significant
differences between VSEs owners’ perceived RDB and CySR based on their industry.
Table 18 summarizes the results of the one-way ANOVA. For RDB the value of F is
2.13, which reaches significance with a p-value of 0.03 which is less than the 0.05 alpha
level: (F(10, 94) = 2.13, p = 0.03) and for CySR the value of F is 3.15, which reaches
significance with a p-value < 0.001 which is less than the 0.05 alpha level: (F(10, 94) =
3.15, p < 0.001). Figure 8 shows a graphical representation of the means and standard
deviations of RDB and CySR by industry. There were significant differences in the oneway ANOVA for both VSEs owners perceived RDB and CySR because the p-value of
the F test were less than the 0.05 alpha level.
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Table 18
ANOVA Results of Difference in RDB and CySR Based on Industry

RDB

Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
CySR Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
* p < 0.05; *** p < 0.001

Sum of
Squares
0.56
2.46
3.02
0.45
1.35
1.80

df
10
94
104
10
94
104

Mean
Square
0.06
0.03
0.05
0.01

F
2.13

Sig.
0.030*

3.15 0.000***

Use of EMV Chip Technology
The descriptive statistics for RDB and CySR based on the use of EMV chip
technology. The descriptive statistics for RDB and CySR based on the type of industry
(Table 19) shows the use of EMV chip technology with the respective means and
standard deviations. For RDB, VSEs who used EMV chip technology (Mean = 0.78,
Standard Deviation = 0.17) while VSEs that did not use EMV chip technology (Mean =
0.71, Standard Deviation 0.16). For CySR, VSEs who used EMV chip technology (Mean
= 0.79, Standard Deviation = 0.13) while VSEs that did not use EMV chip technology
(Mean = 0.74, Standard Deviation 0.12). Figure 9 shows the cybersecurity riskresponsibility taxonomy by use of EMV chip technology. Figure 10 shows a graphical
representation of the means and standard deviations for RDB while Figure 11 shows a
graphical representation of the means and standard deviations for CySR by use of EMV
chip technology.
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Table 19
Descriptive Statistics of RDB and CySR by Use of EMV Chip Technology (N=105)
Use of EMV Chip
Technology

N

RDB
Mean
Std.
Deviation

CySR
Mean
Std.
Deviation

1.Yes = Uses EMV Chip
2.No = Does not use EMV
Chip
Total

45
60

0.78
0.71

0.17
0.16

0.79
0.74

0.13
0.12

105

0.74

0.17

0.76

0.13

Figure 9
Cybersecurity Risk-Responsibility Taxonomy by use of EMV Chip Technology (N=105)
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Figure 10
Means and Standard Deviations of RDB by use of EMV Chip Technology (N=105)
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Figure 11
Means and Standard Deviations of CySR by use of EMV Chip Technology (N=105)
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One-way ANOVA was used to determine whether there were significant
differences between VSEs owners’ perceived RDB and CySR based on their use of EMV
chip technology. Table 20 summarizes the results of the one-way ANOVA. For RDB the
value of F is 3.94, which reaches significance with a p-value of 0.05 which is equal to the
0.05 alpha level: (F(1, 103) = 3.94, p = 0.03) and for CySR the value of F is 4.62, which
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reaches significance with a p-value of 0.03 which is less than the 0.05 alpha level: (F(1,
103) = 4.62, p = 0.03). There were significant differences in the one-way ANOVA for
both VSEs owners perceived RDB and CySR because the p-value of the F test were less
than the or equal to 0.05 alpha level.

Table 20
ANOVA Results of Difference in RDB and CySR Based on use of EMV Chip Technology
(N=105)
Sum of
Squares
RDB

Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
CySR Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
* p < 0.05

0.11
2.91
3.02
0.08
1.72
1.80

df
1
103
104
1
103
104

Mean
Square
0.11
0.03
0.08
0.02

F

Sig.

3.94

0.05

4.62

0.03*

PCI DSS Compliance
The descriptive statistics for RDB and CySR based on the PCI-DSS Compliance.
The descriptive statistics for RDB and CySR (Table 21), shows the PCI-DSS compliance
status of the VSEs with the respective means and standard deviations. For RDB, VSEs
who obtained PCI-DSS compliance (Mean = 0.85, Standard Deviation = 0.14) while
VSEs who did not obtain PCI-DSS compliance (Mean = 0.68, Standard Deviation 0.15)
and, VSEs were uncertain of their PCI-DSS status (Mean = 0.69, Standard Deviation =
0.17). For CySR, VSEs who PCI-DSS compliant (Mean = 0.85, Standard Deviation =
0.13) while VSEs that did not use obtain PCI-DSS compliance (Mean = 0.71, Standard
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Deviation 0.09) and, VSEs were uncertain of their PCI-DSS status (Mean = 0.73,
Standard Deviation = 0.12). Figure 12 shows the cybersecurity risk-responsibility
taxonomy by PCI-DSS compliance. Figure 13 shows a graphical representation of the
means and standard deviations for RDB while figure 14 shows a graphical representation
of the means and standard deviations for CySR by use PCI-DSS compliance.

Table 21
Descriptive Statistics of RDB and CySR by PCI-DSS Compliance (N=105)
PCI-DSS Compliance

1.Yes
2.No
3. Uncertain
Total

N

37
46
22
105

RDB
Mean
Std.
Deviation
0.85
0.68
0.69
0.74

0.14
0.15
0.17
0.17

CySR
Mean
Std.
Deviation
0.85
0.71
0.73
0.76

0.13
0.09
0.12
0.13
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Figure 12
Cybersecurity Risk-Responsibility Taxonomy by PCI-DSS Compliance
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Figure 13
Means and Standard Deviations of RDB by PCI-DSS Compliance (N=105)
1.00

0.90

0.80

0.70

Mean

0.60

0.50

0.40

0.30

0.20

0.10

0.00

RDB

Compliant

Not Compliant

Uncertain

0.85

0.68

0.69

PCI-DSS Compliance

74

Figure 14
Means and Standard Deviations of CySR by PCI-DSS Compliance (N=105)
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One-way ANOVA was used to determine whether there were significant
differences between VSEs owners’ perceived RDB and CySR based on their PCI-DSS
compliance status. Table 20 summarizes the results of the one-way ANOVA. For RDB
the value of F is 13.57, which reaches significance with a p-value < 0.001 which is less
than the 0.05 alpha level: (F(2, 102) = 13.57, p < 0.001) and for CySR the value of F is
17.23, which reaches significance with a p-value < 0.001 which is less than the 0.05
alpha level: (F(2, 102) = 17.23, p < 0.001). There were significant differences in the oneway ANOVA for both VSEs owners perceived RDB and CySR because the p-value of
the F test were less than the 0.05 alpha level.
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Table 22
ANOVA Results of Difference in RDB and CySR Based on PCI-DSS Compliance
(N=105)

RDB

Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
CySR Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
*** p < 0.001

Sum of
Squares
0.63
2.38
3.02
0.45
1.34
1.80

df
2
102
104
2
102
104

Mean
Square
0.32
0.02
0.23
0.01

F

Sig.

13.57 0.000***

17.23 0.000***

Summary
This chapter presented the results of this research study. Phase 1 of this study
used SMEs to evaluate the characteristics for RDB and CySR. The original list of
characteristics was finalized using the feedback from the SMEs. The SME validated
instrument was used for the pilot data study (Phase 2), where a sample of 20 VSEs was
used to further validate the survey instrument of the main study. The overall feedback
from the pilot study did not warrant major changes to the survey instrument.
Phase 3 – the main data collection used the final instrument from the pilot study
to collect data from 105 VSEs. Following the data collection, data screening was
conducted to ensure accurate and reliable data was being used. The main data was
subjected to exploratory factor analysis using principal component analysis to extract
significant factors and further test reliability of the items and provide an answer to RQ2a
and RQ2b: What will be the significant factors for VSEs owners’ perceived RDB and
CySR?
The results of the main data collection were presented to show how the
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aggregated scores of the study participants for the measures RDB and CySR were
positioned on the cybersecurity social risk-responsibility taxonomy. Further analysis was
conducted to determine if industry, use of EMV chip technology and, PCI-DSS
compliance resulted in a significant difference in VSEs owners perceived RDB and
CySR. The result showed that there was a statistically significant difference in both RDB
and CySR for industry, use of EMC Chip and, PCI-DSS compliance.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions, Implications, Recommendations, and Summary

Overview
This chapter provides the conclusions for the research that were derived from the
results of the data analysis. A discussion of the implications, recommendations for future
research, as well as limitations and a summary of the research study. Finally, a synopsis
of the study is presented with a summary of the study’s main goal and, research
methodology along with the findings of the study and its contribution to IS systems
security.

Conclusions
VSEs are especially exposed to data breaches because they tend to be less
equipped to handle complex security issues due to a smaller structure and limited IS
expertise (Berry & Berry, 2018; Cragg et al., 2011; Harris & Patten, 2014). While
information systems security studies have been done on larger organizations, there is a
lack of such research studies on VSEs (Gafni & Pavel, 2019). In addition, the role of
responsibility in the IS research, in particular, security related research studies have not
been thoroughly explored (Hovav & Gray, 2014). Furthermore, much of the research
studies in the IS field center around computer security and not much on cybersecurity
(O’Rourke, 2019). Given that cyber-attacks can be detrimental to VSEs, it is important
that VSEs understand and address their inability to prevent cyber threats.
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This research study was driven by the failure to prevent data breaches in VSEs.
This study is built upon prior research on cybersecurity, IS security, IS systems risk and,
CSR (Hovav & Gray, 2014). The main goal of this research was to develop and validate a
cybersecurity risk-responsibility taxonomy for VSEs’ owners’ perceived CySR and RDB
in order to classify their business level of exposure to a data breach. The goals of this
research study were achieved by studying the relationship between CySR and RDB. A
three-phased approach was used to achieve the four specific goals of this research study.
Because CySR was being developed from the CSR theory, a set of measures for CySR
did not exist and had to be developed. Similarly, a set of measures for perceived RDB
needed to be developed as the first goal as this study. The items for both constructs were
identified from a review of literature and presented to a panel of SMEs for review. The
results of the expert panel review solidified the validity of the items that were being used
for the survey instrument which was then used to conduct a pilot study for further
validation.
The second goal of this research was to identify the factors for VSEs perceived
RDB and CySR. The identification of the factors made it possible to determine the main
categories for the RDB and CySR constructs in order to develop the aggregated scores for
classification of the level of exposure to a data breach. The third goal of this research was
to plot the aggregated scores of VSEs’ owner’s perceived CySR and RDB on the
cybersecurity risk-responsibility taxonomy.
The cybersecurity risk-responsibility taxonomy classified VSEs in terms of their
owners’ perceived CySR, i.e. whether they display concern for society (high CySR) or
concern for economic performance (low CySR), and their perceived risk of a potential
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data breach (Low, Medium, & High). The overall results show that VSEs have a high
CySR, as well as, a high RDB. According to the suggested implications of each cell in
the cybersecurity risk-responsibility taxonomy, the first cell C1, consists of a low VSE’s
owner’s perceived RDB and shows a concern for society. This cell is labeled ‘lax’
suggesting that the VSEs in this cell are oblivious to the potential of an RDB. The second
cell C2, consists of a low VSE’s owners’ perceived RDB and shows concern for
economic performance. This cell is labeled ‘relaxed’, suggesting that the VSEs in this
cell are not strict in safeguarding against a data breach. The third cell C3 is labeled
‘engaged’, with a medium VSE’s owners’ perceived RDB and shows concern for society.
VSEs in this cell participate in activities that put them at medium RDB. The fourth cell
C4, consists of a medium VSE’s owners’ perceived RDB and demonstrates a concern for
economic performance. This cell is labeled ‘liable’, suggesting that there may be a likely
RDB. The fifth cell C5, demonstrates a high VSE’s owner’s perceived RDB demonstrates
a concern for society. This cell has been labeled ‘accountable’, suggesting that VSEs in
this cell demonstrate ethical awareness and are considered accountable. The sixth cell C6,
represents VSEs that are at high owner’s perceived RDB and demonstrates concern for
economic performance. This cell is labeled ‘dependable’, suggesting that while
responsibility focus is geared toward economic performance, VSEs in this cell are still
aware of the importance of securing against data breaches.
The fourth goal of this study was to assess whether significant differences exist in
VSEs’ owners’ perceived CySR and RDB based on type of industry, implementation of
EMV chip technology, and compliance with PCI-DSS. The results of this assessment
indicated whether there was a statistically significant difference in both RDB and CySR
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for industry, use of EMC Chip and, PCI-DSS compliance. This finding implies a
statistical difference in RDB and CySR based on industry. This is most likely due to the
nature of the business, the type of data collected and, existing standards and regulations
that govern them. For example, the healthcare industry was the highest for RDB.
Healthcare providers such as doctors’ offices are required by law to protect the storage
and transmission of sensitive data. The VSEs identifying as being in the technology
industry were also among the highest RDB and CySR. A reasonable assumption is that
technology companies have a high perceived RDB and CySR because of the expertise of
their staff and the services they provide to their wider community. The lowest RDB were
the construction, food and restaurant and companies identifying as “other” industries.
Restaurants widely use swipe and signature type terminals which are frequently targeted
by cyber criminals.
There was also a difference in RDB and CySR for the use of EMV chip
technology and PCI-DSS compliance. The EMV chip technology is considered a more
secure way to use credit cards and can help to reduce data breaches. In addition,
companies that engage in the use of EMV chip technology see that as a way to prevent
such breaches and, though not required to do so, are engaging in civic responsibility
showing concern for society. Similarly, PCI-DSS compliance, though not mandated is
deemed a way of mitigating these risks, as a result, companies that have obtained this
compliance are already taking these risks seriously. The threat of having customers'
payment card data stolen is real, but it can be reduced by adhering to PCI-DSS
(Raghavan et al. 2017).
Limitations were noted with this study. The first limitation is the method used to
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solicit participation in the study. The organizations were sent an email inviting them to
participate in the study with a clickable link to the survey. This email could have been
viewed by some VSEs owners as spam or phishing. This led to a small number of
participants in the study which can impact the generalizability of the findings. Another
limitation was the size of the survey instrument and the time it would take to complete
the survey. Without prior knowledge of the study, it is unlikely that VSEs owners would
willingly participate in a survey which they were unaware of.
Implications
This research study has some implications for the existing body of knowledge in
the area of cybersecurity and corporate social responsibility. This study raises awareness
of cybersecurity among VSEs. A contribution to practice was the development of the
survey instrument which can be used by VSEs to determine their level of preparedness
for cybersecurity. Another implication of this study is that the results and conclusions
may assist organizations in understanding and mitigating a cybersecurity data breach.
The theoretical implications of this study include the cybersecurity riskresponsibility taxonomy which can be used to further compare and provide insight on
VSEs CySR and perceived RDB. This study further contributes to the body of knowledge
by introducing CSR to IS studies which further facilitates discussion on the social factors
influencing the cybersecurity position of small enterprises.
Recommendations and Future Research
Future studies are necessary to improve the validity of the CySR instrument. First,
the number of SMEs who participated in the expert panel review of the study could be
increased to include more SMEs outside of government and academia, specifically,

82

industry experts with insight on small business operations should be targeted for
inclusion on the SME panel. Second, an increase in the sample size of the study
population to improve both validity and generalizability of the findings. Third, the study
could be replicated with addition demographic markers such as, having an online
storefront, number of years in business and average age of the business owner. By adding
additional demographic markers, further discussion and analysis of factors influencing
CySR and RDB for research and practice. Fourth, the validated factors for RDB were
consistent with what was proposed, however, CySR had to be modified. This is likely due
to CySR being developed from CSR which has had different classifications over the
years. Therefore, additional research could be carried out to identify additional factors for
CySR.

Summary
This study developed a classification methodology to classify VSEs based on
their perceived CySR as well as RDB. Factors for VSEs RDB and CySR were identified
in order to obtain the aggregated scores for the cybersecurity risk-responsibility
taxonomy. The cybersecurity risk-responsibility taxonomy was developed from a sample
of 105 VSEs to classify them in terms of their owners’ perceived CySR and perceived
RDB.
In order to develop a reliable and valid method of measuring the VSEs owners
perceived RDB and CySR, this study was conducted in three phases. Phase 1 of the study
used SMEs to identify the characteristics for RDB and CySR via the Delphi method.
Thirteen SMEs from academia, government and industry participated in the development
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of the RDB and CySR items for the study. This process was necessary because measures
didn’t exist for RDB and CySR. Phase 2 involved a pilot test with a small sample of the
population. A total of 20 VSEs participated in the pilot study which further validated the
instrument. The results of the pilot study did not warrant major additional changes to the
survey instrument which was used for the main data collection.
The final phase (Phase 3) involved the data analysis, taxonomy development
testing of the hypotheses. The collected data was subjected to screening to identify
factors for RDB and CySR. Upon completion of the data analysis for RDB, external risk
from cyber criminals, internal risk from users and, physical risk from outsiders were the
resulting factors. Whereas the data analysis for CySR resulted in two factors; business
responsibility and legal responsibility. Data aggregations showed that scores of 105 VSEs
were positioned in all 6 cells of the cybersecurity risk-responsibility taxonomy. The
majority of the scores were on the high end of VSEs owners perceived CySR which
indicated that VSEs in general showed concern for society. For perceived RDB the
responses were spread throughout low medium and high, however, the majority of VSEs
were in the high range, a moderate amount in the medium range and, a small amount on
the low end.
During the study, further analysis was performed to determine if significant
differences exist in VSEs owners’ perceived RDB and CySR based on three
demographics: (1) type of industry, (2) implementation of EMV chip technology, (3)
compliance with PCI-DSS. The results of this analysis showed that there were
considerable differences in both RDB and CySR for industry, use of EMC Chip and, PCIDSS compliance.
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In summary, this research addressed the failure to prevent data breaches in VSEs
who are at risk because they do not understand cybersecurity, or they do not have experts
on hand to help safeguard their computer systems. The findings of this research suggest
that different business industries have a higher perceived risk of a cybersecurity data
breach. In particular, those industries such as healthcare are generally forced to protect
the storage and transmission of sensitive data. VSEs in generally demonstrate a high level
of cybersecurity social responsibility, showing concern for the society, despite their
perception of a risk of a cybersecurity data breach. In conclusion, VSEs need to be more
aware of the risks associated with a cybersecurity data breach and, the impact such a risk
places on the wider society. Because VSEs demonstrate a concern for society, such
awareness would encourage decision makers to utilize the necessary practices to ensure
safety of their computer systems and help to mitigate cybersecurity data breaches.
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Appendix A
Dear IT/IS Expert,

My name is Keiona Davis and I am a doctoral candidate at the College of Engineering
and Computing, Nova Southeastern University (NSU). I am currently working under the
supervision of Dr. Yair Levy, Professor of IS and Cybersecurity on a dissertation entitled
“Cybersecurity Risk-Responsibility Taxonomy: The Role of Cybersecurity Social
Responsibility in Small Enterprises on Risk of Data Breach.” The main goal of this
proposed research is to develop and validate a cybersecurity risk-responsibility taxonomy
for VSEs’ cybersecurity social responsibility (CySR) and risk of data breach (RDB).
I would like to request your assistance in providing feedback as a subject matter expert
for my upcoming doctoral research study. Please review the preliminary survey
instrument attached to this email and complete the quantitative and qualitative evaluation
form using the link below. Your input will shape the final instrument for this proposed
study.

Best Regards,

Keiona Davis, Ph.D. Candidate
College of Engineering and Computing
Nova Southeastern University
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Appendix B
Section 1: Proposed factors and characteristics

The items in Section 1 are related to the proposed factors and characteristics for Risk of
Data Breach and Cybersecurity Social Responsibility. Please evaluate and provide
feedback on the list of characteristics in the tables below.

Risk of Data Breach Factors and Characteristics
Proposed Risk of Data Breach

Proposed Risk of Data Breach (RDB)

(RDB) Factors

Characteristics

External Risk from Cybercriminals

A1. Lack of firewall software
A2. Lack of intrusion detection systems
A3. Lack of a password strength policy
A4. Unencrypted transmission of cardholder data
A5. Lack of security awareness to social
engineering and phishing
A6. Lack of malware protection

Internal Risk from Users (Such as
disgruntled employees or human
error/mistake)

A7. Lack of user knowledge or training
A8. Improper access permission (e.g. employees
having unnecessary privilege)
A9. Improper access to software
A10. Lack of separation of duties
A11. Weak encryption or poor key-management
practices
A12. Lack of physical monitoring
A13. Insecure handling of payment terminals
A14. Disposal of storage media with data
A15. Unsupervised visitors such as vendors

Risk of Physical Intruder/Thief

Cybersecurity Social Responsibility Factors and Characteristics

87

Proposed Cybersecurity Social
Responsibility (CySR) Factors
Economic CySR

Proposed Cybersecurity Social
Responsibility (CySR) Characteristics
B1. The organization is successful at
maximizing profits
B2. The organization strives to lower
operating costs
B3. Owners/managers try to establish longterm strategies for the organization

Legal CySR

B4. Owners/managers are aware of
cybersecurity laws
B5. Software products meet legal standards
B6. Owners/Managers try to comply with the
law

Ethical CySR

B7. The organization has a comprehensive
information security policy
B8. The organization follows information
security standards
B9. The organization is recognized as a
trustworthy company
B10. A procedure is in place for employees
to report misconduct or misuse of
information systems

Discretionary CySR

B11.The organization tries to improve its
corporate image
B12. The organization tries to improve the
perception of how it conducts business
B13. The organization contributes to the
bettering of the local community

Expert Panel Evaluation for Risk of Data Breach Characteristics
In the section below, please provide your expert opinion about the list of characteristics for Risk of
Data Breach by very small companies. For each of the proposed characteristics below, please select
one of the three options:
1. Keep - the proposed characteristic should be included as is.
2. Adjust- the characteristic should be included but with modifications (Please provide your feedback
below on the exact modifications at the short text field at the end of the list of characteristics in
question A21).
3. Remove - the proposed characteristic should NOT be included (Please recommend reasons below
on why not, and propose a replacement if possible at the end of the list of characteristics in question
A22)
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If you feel there are characteristics not covered here that should be included, please include them in
“Additional characteristics to be included” below.

Please provide a recommendation for each of the proposed Risk of Data
Breach characteristics (As) below.
Keep
A1. Lack of firewall software
A2. Lack of intrusion detection systems
A3. Lack of a password strength policy
A4. Unencrypted transmission of cardholder
data
A5. Lack of security awareness to social
engineering and phishing
A6. Lack of malware protection
A7. Lack of user knowledge or training
A8. Improper access permission (e.g.
employees having unnecessary privilege)
A9. Improper access to software
A10. Lack of separation of duties
A11. Weak encryption or poor keymanagement practices
A12. Lack of physical monitoring

A13. Insecure handling of payment terminals

Adjust

Remove
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A14. Disposal of storage media with data

A15. Unsupervised visitors such as vendors

A21. Please provide adjustments that you see fit to the proposed Risk of Data Breach
characteristics listed above (A1 to A15):
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
A22. Please provide additional characteristics that you see fit to be included for Risk of
Data Breach beyond those listed above:
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________

Expert Panel Evaluation for Cybersecurity Social Responsibility
Characteristics
In the section below, please provide your expert opinion about the list of characteristics for
Cybersecurity Social Responsibility by very small companies. For each of the proposed characteristics
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below, please select one of the three options:
1. Keep - the proposed characteristic should be included as is.
2. Adjust- the characteristic should be included but with modifications (Please provide your feedback
below on the exact modifications at the short text field at the end of the list of characteristics in
question B21).
3. Remove - the proposed characteristic should NOT be included (Please recommend reasons below
on why not, and propose a replacement if possible at the end of the list of characteristics in question
B22)
If you feel there are characteristics not covered here that should be included, please include them in
“Additional characteristics to be included” below.
In the section below, please provide your expert opinion about the list of characteristics for
Cybersecurity Social Responsibility.
For each of the proposed characteristics below, please select one of the three options:
1. Keep - the proposed characteristic should be included
2. Adjust- the characteristic should be included but with modifications. Please include feedback for
any topics under the “Adjustment to proposed characteristics” short text field below.
3. Remove - the proposed characteristic should NOT be included
If you feel there are characteristics not covered here that should be included, please include them in
“Additional characteristics to be included” below.

Please provide a recommendation for each of the proposed
Cybersecurity Social Responsibility characteristics below.
Keep
B1. The organization is successful at
maximizing profits
B2. The organization strives to lower
operating costs
B3. Owners/managers try to establish
long-term strategies for the organization
B4. Owners/managers are aware of
cybersecurity laws
B5. Software products meet legal
standards

Adjust

Remove

91
B6. Owners/Managers try to comply
with the law
B7. The organization has a
comprehensive information security
policy
B8. The organization follows
information security standards
B9. The organization is recognized as a
trustworthy company
B10. A procedure is in place for
employees to report misconduct or
misuse of information systems
B11. The organization tries to improve
its corporate image
B12. The organization tries to improve
the perception of how it conducts
business
B13. The organization contributes to the
bettering of the local community

B21. Please provide adjustments that you see fit to the proposed Risk of Data Breach
characteristics listed above (B1 to B13):
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
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________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________

B22. Please provide additional characteristics that you see fit to be included for Risk of
Data Breach beyond those listed above:
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
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Appendix C

Proposed survey instrument

A. Risk of Data Breach
External Risk from Cybercriminals (ERCC)
Below you will find a set of characteristics related to external risk from cyber criminals at
your organization. Please rate each on a scale from 1 to 3.
No, and not

No, but

considered

considered

(1)

(2)

A1. My organization has firewall software installed on
computers
A2. My organization utilizes an intrusion detection system
A3. My organization has a password strength policy
A4. My organization ensures encrypted transmission of
cardholder data
A5. My organization is aware of social engineering and
phishing
A6. My organization uses malware protection

Internal risk from users such as disgruntled employees (IRU).

Yes

(3)
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Below you will find a set of characteristics related to internal risk from users at your
organization. Please rate each on a scale from 1 to 7.
Strongly

Disagree

disagree

Somewhat

Neither

Somewhat

disagree

agree or

agree

Agree

Strongly
agree

disagree
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

A7. My organization conducts
training on internal cyber risk
A8. Each employee only has
access or permission to
computers necessary to carry out
his/her work on a need to know
basis
A9. Each employee has access
only to specific modules or files
in the computer system to carry
out his/her work
A10. My organization has a
clearly defined separation of
duties for each employee
A11. My organization uses
strong password encryption
practices

External risk from a physical intruder or thief (PIT)
Below you will find a set of characteristics related to external risk from a physical

(7)
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intruder or thief at your organization. Please rate each on a scale from 1 to 3.

A12. My organization has security cameras for physical
monitoring

A13. Only employees can access payment terminals

A14. My organization wipes all data from storage
media before disposal

A15. Visits from vendors are always supervised

No, and not

No, but

considered

considered

(1)

(2)

Yes

(3)
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Proposed survey instrument

B. Cybersecurity Social Responsibility
Economic Cybersecurity Social Responsibility (EcCySR)
Below you will find a set of characteristics related to economic cybersecurity social
responsibility at your organization. Please rate each on a scale from 1 to 7.
Strongly

Disagree

disagree

Somewhat

Neither

Somewhat

disagree

agree or

agree

Agree

Strongly
agree

disagree
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

B1. My organization has been successful
at maximizing profits
B2. My organization tries to lower
operating costs
B3. Owners/Managers try to establish
long-term strategies for the organization

Legal Cybersecurity Social Responsibility (LCySR)
Below you will find a set of characteristics related to legal cybersecurity social
responsibility at your organization. Please rate each on a scale from 1 to 7.
Strongly

Disagree

disagree

Somewhat

Neither

Somewhat

disagree

agree or

agree

Agree

Strongly
agree

disagree
(1)

B4. Owners and managers are
familiar with cybersecurity laws
B5. The software products used

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(7)
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by the organization meet legal
standards
B6. Owners and managers
comply with the cybersecurity
laws

Ethical Cybersecurity Social Responsibility (ECySR)
Below you will find a set of characteristics related to ethical cybersecurity social
responsibility at your organization. Please rate each on a scale from 1 to 7.
Strongly

Disagree

disagree

Somewhat

Neither

Somewhat

disagree

agree or

agree

Agree

Strongly
agree

disagree
(1)

B7. My organization has a
comprehensive information
security policy
B8. My organization follows
information security standards
B9. My organization is
recognized as a trustworthy
company
B10. My organization has a
procedure in place for employees
to report misconduct or misuse
of information systems
B11. My organization follows
information security standards

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)
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B12. My organization is
recognized as a trustworthy
company
B13. My organization has a
procedure in place for employees
to report misconduct or misuse
of information systems
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Appendix D
Survey for Participants

Survey - The Role of Cybersecurity Social
Responsibility in Small Enterprises on Risk of
Data Breach
Dear Business Owner/manager
My name is Keiona Davis and I am a doctoral candidate at the College of Engineering and Computing, Nova
Southeastern University (NSU). I am currently working under the supervision of Dr. Yair Levy, Professor of IS
and Cybersecurity on a dissertation entitled “Cybersecurity Risk-Responsibility Taxonomy: The Role of
Cybersecurity Social Responsibility in Small Enterprises (SEs) on Risk of Data Breach.”
Why are you asking me to be in this research study?
You are being asked to take part in this research study because your company has been identiTed as a small
enterprise accepting credit card payments.
Why is this research being done?
The purpose of this study is to develop and validate a cybersecurity risk-responsibility taxonomy for SEs’
cybersecurity social responsibility (CySR) and risk of data breach (RDB).
What will I be doing if I agree to be in this research study?
You will be taking a one-time, anonymous survey. The survey will take approximately 10 minutes to complete.
This research study involves minimal risk to you.
Are there possible risks and discomforts to me?
To the best of our knowledge, the things you will be doing have no more risk of harm than you would have in
everyday life.
Will it cost me anything? Will I get paid for being in the study?
There is no cost for participation in this study. Participation is voluntary and no payment will be provided.
How will you keep my information private?
Your responses are anonymous. Information we learn about you in this research study will be handled in a
conTdential manner, within the limits of the law. You will not be required to provide any identiTable information
about your organization. This data will be available to the researcher, the Institutional Review Board and other
representatives of this institution, and any granting agencies (if applicable). All conTdential data will be kept
securely on google forms. All data will be kept for 36 months from the end of the study and destroyed after
that time by deleting all data collected.
Who can I talk to about the study?
If you have questions, you can contact me at 954-990-3830 or my advisor Dr. Levy at levyy@nova,edu.
Additionally, if you have read the above information and voluntarily wish to participate in this research study,
please click next to continue.
If you have questions about the study but want to talk to someone else who is not a part of the study, you can
call the Nova Southeastern University Institutional Review Board (IRB) at (954) 262-5369 or toll free at 1-866499-0790 or email at IRB@nova.edu.
Do you understand and do you want to be in the study?
You can decide not to participate in this research and it will not be held against you. You can exit the survey at
any time.
If you have read the above information and voluntarily wish to participate in this research study, please click
NEXT below.
Best Regards,

Keiona Davis, Ph.D. Candidate
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